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Introduction
It is a settled and invariable principle, that every right, when
withheld, must have a remedy, and every injury its proper
redress. I
It is not a case of a wrong without a remedy. It is a case of a
wrong without a judicial remedy. It is a case of a wrong
where there is a remedy, but that remedy is legislative, not ju-
dicial. ... [W]rongs should be remedied in the right way and
not in a wrong way.2
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School. Many thanks to
Michael Abramowicz, Bryan Camp, Leandra Lederman, Richard Pierce, Peter Strauss, and par-
ticipants in the Junior Tax Scholars' Workshop, the Junior Administrative Law Scholars Mini-
Conference, and faculty workshops at Florida State University College of Law and Washington
& Lee University School of Law for their helpful comments and suggestions.
1 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 147 (1803).
2 Preston v. Sturgis Milling Co., 183 F. 1, 19 (6th Cir. 1910).
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The Treasury Department ("Treasury") promulgates hundreds of
regulations interpreting the Internal Revenue Code ("I.R.C."). 3 In a
recent article, I outlined and documented empirically why, under gen-
eral principles of administrative law, a substantial percentage of Trea-
sury regulations interpreting the I.R.C.-more than forty percent of
those studied-are susceptible to legal challenge for Treasury's failure
to follow procedural requirements imposed by the Administrative
Procedure Act ("APA"). 4 I also suggested that the failings I identified
may not be the only procedural problems with Treasury's rulemaking
efforts.5 Tremendous potential exists for unhappy taxpayers to chal-
lenge Treasury regulations in court for their procedural failings.
Yet, despite plenty of tax litigation, including frequent claims that
Treasury regulations are substantively flawed, 6 taxpayers rarely con-
test Treasury regulations on procedural grounds. 7 Given Treasury's
3 The I.R.C. typically delegates authority to promulgate regulations to the Secretary of
the Treasury, and Treasury formally issues regulations interpreting the I.R.C. See, e.g., I.R.C.
§ 7805(a) (2000) (granting general authority to develop "all needful rules and regulations for the
enforcement of' the I.R.C.); id. § 1502 (giving the Secretary of the Treasury broad specific au-
thority to adopt regulations for determining the tax liabilities of affiliated groups of corpora-
tions). Nevertheless, IRS attorneys play a prominent role in the process of developing Treasury
regulations. See INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL § 32.1.1.4.4 (2004); see also LEANDRA LEDER-
MAN & STEPHEN W. MAZZA, TAX CONTROVERSIES § 1.04 (2d ed. 2002) (comparing Treasury
and IRS involvement in regulation drafting); Paul F. Schmid, The Tax Regulations Making Pro-
cess-Then and Now, 24 TAX LAW. 541, 542-46 (1971) (describing historic process for promul-
gating Treasury regulations). Accordingly, readers should understand references in this Article
to Treasury and its practices in promulgating Treasury regulations as including both Treasury and
the IRS.
4 See Kristin E. Hickman, Coloring Outside the Lines: Examining Treasury's (Lack of)
Compliance with Administrative Procedure Act Rulemaking Requirements, 82 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1727, 1740-59 (2007) (documenting methodology and findings of study of 232 regulatory
projects for which Treasury published notices of proposed rulemaking, temporary regulations, or
final regulations in the Federal Register between January 1, 2003, and December 31, 2005); see
also Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 701-06 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
5 See Hickman, supra note 4, at 1747-48.
6 See, e.g., Boeing Co. v. United States, 537 U.S. 437, 446 (2003) (outlining dispute over
validity of Treas. Reg. § 1.861-8(e)(3)); Swallows Holding, Ltd. v. Comm'r, 515 F.3d 162, 165-66
(3d Cir. 2008) (summarizing taxpayer's substantive challenge to Treas. Reg. § 1.882-4(a)(3)(i) as
an invalid exercise of rulemaking authority); Square D Co. v. Comm'r, 438 F.3d 739, 742-43 (7th
Cir. 2006) (recognizing taxpayer's bases for challenging the validity of Treas. Reg. § 1.267(a)-3,
all substantive).
7 Searching for such cases methodically has proven difficult; my efforts thus far have
turned up only a small number of APA-based procedural challenges to Treasury regulations in
the last thirty years. See Schwalbach v. Comm'r, 111 T.C. 215, 219 (1998) ("Petitioners' sole
argument is that section 1.469-2(0(6) ... is invalid as applied to them because, petitioners allege,
the Commissioner prescribed section 1.469-4(a) ... without complying with the notice-and-com-
ment requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act ...."); Griffin Indus., Inc. v. United
States, 27 Fed. Cl. 183, 188 (1992) ("Griffin further argues that the animal waste exception of
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track record, one is left with the question: why do we not see more
such claims?
It may well be that many taxpayers are satisfied with any gui-
dance that allows them to arrange their affairs with certainty. But the
idea that all taxpayers are so satisfied with Treasury's regulatory ef-
forts as to render procedural challenges unthinkable is simply untena-
ble. Many Treasury regulations are controversial and impose
significant tax or reporting burdens on taxpayers. Even those regula-
tions that please many or even most taxpayers nevertheless draw lines
that either include taxpayers who think they should be excluded or
vice versa. Further, many regulations address questions with sizeable
financial consequences that far outstrip the potential costs of litigation
and thus arguably justify allocating the resources to challenge rather
than acquiesce to the regulation.
Maybe tax lawyers are simply unaware of the procedural argu-
ments available. Some degree of tax community ignorance of nontax
administrative law principles undoubtedly contributes to the paucity
of procedural challenges. Many years ago, government officials re-
sponsible for drafting Treasury regulations were also well versed in
the requirements of administrative law.8 Over time, however, benign
neglect and a restructuring of Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") per-
sonnel and priorities have yielded contemporary drafters of tax regu-
lations with little knowledge of or regard for administrative law
requirements. 9 Correspondingly, other tax scholars have observed the
final Treas. Reg. § 1.48-9(g)(1) (1981) is invalid ... because the notice requirements of the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act (APA) were not met .. "); Stephenson v. Brady, 927 F.2d 596, 1991
WL 22835, at *2-3 (4th Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (unpublished table decision) (concerning tax-
payer's allegation that implementing Treasury regulation and related tax forms violated the APA
notice-and-comment requirements); Dow Coming Corp. v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 184, 192
(1990) ("Plaintiff argues that Treasury Regulations § 1.994-2(b)(3) and (c)(2) were issued in vio-
lation of the Administrative Procedure Act because there was a failure to comply with the 'no-
tice and comments' requirement."); Wing v. Comm'r, 81 T.C. 17, 26 (1983) ("Petitioner's first
contention is that since the regulation was not promulgated in accordance with the Administra-
tive Procedure Act ... it is invalid."); Am. Med. Ass'n v. United States, 887 F.2d 760, 765 (7th
Cir. 1989) ("The AMA argues, most generally, that the allocation regulations are invalid because
the IRS did not comply with the notice and comment requirements of the Administrative Proce-
dure Act (the 'APA') in promulgating the rules."); cf. Hosp. Corp. of Am. v. Comm'r, 348 F.3d
136, 145 n.3 (6th Cir. 2003) (noting taxpayer's failure to raise potential APA procedural claims in
challenging validity of temporary Treasury regulations and thus declining to consider the issue).
Other cases raising such claims likely exist, but the mere difficulty in locating them, given the
volume of tax cases generally, is indicative of their relative infrequency.
8 See Hickman, supra note 4, at 1796-97 (describing early attitudes toward APA compli-
ance among Treasury and IRS officials).
9 See id. at 1797-99 (documenting changes in IRS organizational structure, priorities, and
practices).
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tax bar's insular nature and resulting tendency to disregard potentially
relevant nontax legal doctrine.'0
From these trends, one might conclude that many taxpayers and
tax lawyers simply accept at face value Treasury's representation that
most of its regulations are exempt from APA rulemaking require-
ments.'I For others who might be more skeptical of Treasury's exemp-
tion claims, the relevant administrative law jurisprudence may be far
enough outside their experiential comfort zone to cause them to shy
away from raising claims based on administrative law. While any of
these possibilities may be true in some cases, they are ultimately un-
satisfying as the whole story. Trade and taxpayer groups pay close
attention to relevant tax law changes. The tax bar and its clients are,
collectively, highly sophisticated. The significant dollars at stake in
many high-profile tax cases make it unlikely that the possibility of
challenging unfavorable Treasury regulations on procedural grounds
lies wholly undetected.
Another possible explanation, the subject of this Article, is that
statutory and doctrinal limitations combine in the tax context to deter
taxpayers from pursuing APA compliance claims. Part I of this Arti-
cle offers a brief summary of Treasury's procedural failings. Part II.A
of this Article then looks at statutory prohibitions against injunctions
and declaratory judgments in the tax context that the courts have ap-
plied to preclude virtually all pre-enforcement judicial review of tax
matters. Though the jurisprudence is surprisingly underdeveloped,
Part II.B examines how broader justiciability limitations such as
standing and ripeness may present an additional burden upon taxpay-
ers seeking pre-enforcement review. Part III considers further limita-
10 See, e.g., Paul L. Caron, Tax Myopia, or Mamas Don't Let Your Babies Grow Up to Be
Tax Lawyers, 13 VA. TAX REV. 517, 518 (1994) ("[T]ax law too often is mistakenly viewed by
lawyers, judges, and law professors as a self-contained body of law .... [T]his misperception has
impaired the development of tax law by shielding it from other areas of law that should inform
the tax debate."); Leandra Lederman, "Civil"izing Tax Procedure: Applying General Federal
Learning to Statutory Notices of Deficiency, 30 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 183, 183 (1996) ("Tax law
tends to be uninformed by other areas of law. This insularity has the unfortunate consequence
of depriving tax and other fields of cross-fertilization."); Bryan T. Camp, Tax Administration as
Inquisitorial Process and the Partial Paradigm Shift in the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of
1998, 56 FLA. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (2004) (echoing calls for cross-fertilization between tax and nontax
legal analysis).
11 See INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL § 32.1.5.4.7.5.1(5) (2004) ("Interpretative rules are
not subject to the provisions of 5 U.S.C. [§] 553(b), (c), and (d). Although most IRSfTreasury
regulations are interpretative, and therefore not subject to these provisions of the APA, the IRS
usually solicits public comment on all NPRMs."); see also id. § 32.1.2.3(3) ("Interpretative regu-
lations are generally not subject to the APA provisions on rulemaking, including its notice and
comment requirements.").
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tions imposed by "enforcement-based" judicial review of tax cases-
that is, review of cases commenced after the IRS applies the tax laws
to individual taxpayers. 12 Specifically, Part III.A summarizes the ad-
ministrative burdens imposed upon those seeking judicial review
through tax refund or deficiency actions. Part III.B reflects upon the
potential futility of challenging temporary regulations in such cases.
Part III.C examines the possible impact and resulting deterrent effect
of judicial deference doctrines that govern courts' consideration of en-
forcement-based, as-applied tax challenges.
It is doubtful that any of these limitations independently explains
the lack of procedural challenges against Treasury regulations. How-
ever, the accumulation of statutory and doctrinal obstacles raises a
formidable barrier that undoubtedly operates as a substantial disin-
centive against pursuing such claims. In other words, statutory provi-
sions and the courts' own jurisprudence combined discourage
procedural challenges against Treasury regulations to the point of de-
nying taxpayers an adequate judicial remedy to vindicate procedural
rights granted in the APA.
Widespread Treasury noncompliance with the APA in drafting
tax regulations and rules may be an unintended price of this remedial
failure. Part IV.A explores the tradeoffs inherent in this status quo
and, thus, reasons why the courts might care to reconsider their ap-
proach to pre-enforcement judicial review in the tax context. Finally,
for those who find the balance struck by the courts' jurisprudence to
be less than optimal, Part IV.B discusses alternative interpretations of
relevant law that might support such pre-enforcement review of facial
challenges to Treasury regulations and thus resolve this remedial
problem. Ultimately, however, congressional action may be necessary
to provide a meaningful remedy.
I. Recapping the Problem
Provisions of the APA that impose procedural requirements for
agency rulemaking activity apply generally to Treasury's efforts to
promulgate rules and regulations interpreting the I.R.C.1 3 Treasury
12 See infra note 46 and accompanying text (explaining utilization of "enforcement-based"
terminology).
13 See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 601.601(a)(2) (2007) ("Where required by 5 U.S.C. [§] 553 and in
such other instances as may be desirable, the Commissioner publishes in the Federal Register
general notice of proposed rules."); INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL § 32.1.2.3(1)-(3) (2004)
("Several Federal administrative laws and procedures apply to the regulatory process .... The
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) requires agencies to publish Notices of Proposed
Rulemaking (NPRMs) in the Federal Register and permit the public to submit comments.");
20081 1157
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claims that most of its regulations interpreting the I.R.C. are exempt
from APA notice-and-comment procedural requirements but also that
it follows those procedures anyway in promulgating its regulations. 14
In fact, the opposite is true.
First, under general principles of administrative law, it is difficult
to characterize most Treasury regulations as anything other than legis-
lative rules subject to the notice-and-comment rulemaking require-
ments of APA § 553(b) and (c) and ineligible for the interpretative
rule, procedural rule, or good cause exceptions from those proce-
dures. 15 In the preambles to its Notices of Proposed Rulemaking
("NPRMs"), temporary regulations, and final regulations, Treasury al-
most always denies the applicability of APA § 553(b), but with little or
no elaboration. 16 The IRS contends that most Treasury regulations
are interpretative rules, and thus exempt from the APA's public no-
tice-and-comment requirements. 17 This position is generally implausi-
ble under modern conceptions of the distinction between legislative
and interpretative rules, murky as that doctrine is.18
Taxpayers are subject to congressionally imposed penalties for
failing to follow Treasury regulations in filing tax returns. 19 Congress,
Wing v. Comm'r, 81 T.C. 17, 26-27 (1983) ("[T]he [IRS] Commissioner must conform generally
to the requirements of the APA in promulgating regulations .....
14 See supra note 11.
15 See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2000); see also Hickman, supra note 4, at 1759-95 (explaining why
Treasury regulations generally are not interpretative rules or procedural rules and do not qualify
for the good cause exception).
16 Treasury explicitly claimed that APA notice-and-comment rulemaking requirements did
not apply in 213, or 91.8%, of the 232 regulatory projects studied, but asserted the interpretative
rule, procedural rule, or good cause exceptions by name roughly 10% of the time, i.e., only 23
times in 232 projects. See Hickman, supra note 4, at 1749-51. Treasury usually offers only a
brief, conclusory statement in support of such claims, e.g., "[i]t has been determined that section
553(b) of the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. chapter 5) does not apply to this regula-
tion," or something to that effect. See INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL § 32.1.5.4.7.5.4.3 (2004)
(telling drafters of regulations deemed interpretative to include the quoted language in the Spe-
cial Analysis section of the preamble); see also, e.g., Corporate Reorganizations; Guidance on
the Measurement of Continuity of Interest, T.D. 9225, 70 Fed. Reg. 54,631, 54,634 (Sept. 16,
2005) (using virtually identical language); Guidance Regarding the Simplified Service Cost
Method and the Simplified Production Method, T.D. 9217, 70 Fed. Reg. 44,467, 44,468 (Aug. 3,
2005) (same); Section 179 Elections, T.D. 9209, 70 Fed. Reg. 40,189, 40,190 (July 13, 2005)
(same). Even Treasury's more extensive explanations in asserting the good cause exception usu-
ally consist of only two or three generic sentences about the need for immediate guidance. See
Hickman, supra note 4, at 1781 & n.247 (offering examples); see also INTERNAL REVENUE MAN-
UAL § 32.1.5.4.7.5.1(4) (2004) (providing boilerplate language for good cause claims).
17 See supra note 11.
18 See Hickman, supra note 4, at 1760-73 (criticizing application of interpretative rule ex-
ception to Treasury regulations).
19 See I.R.C. § 6662 (2000).
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Treasury, and taxpayers all operate with the understanding that Trea-
sury regulations, whether temporary or final, are legally binding on
both taxpayers and the government.20 At a minimum, the tax commu-
nity has always understood that Treasury regulations promulgated
pursuant to specific grants of authority in substantive I.R.C. provi-
sions are legislative in character. 21 Yet, Treasury often fails to follow
APA rulemaking requirements even when it issues regulations pursu-
ant to such authority.22 On those infrequent occasions when Treasury
makes an explicit claim to the good cause exception, Treasury rarely
offers the sort of particularized explanation often demanded by the
courts.23
Moreover, Treasury's actual practice is inconsistent with its claim
that it complies with APA notice-and-comment requirements even
when those requirements do not apply. Occasionally Treasury ignores
notice-and-comment rulemaking altogether and typically either fails
to claim good cause or does so with only a few sentences of nonspe-
cific boilerplate unlikely to pass muster with a reviewing court.24 The
20 See, e.g., Swallows Holding, Ltd. v. Comm'r, 515 F.3d 162, 168-69 (3d Cir. 2008) (hold-
ing that reasonable final Treasury regulations promulgated under I.R.C. § 7805 carry the force of
law); Estate of Gerson v. Comm'r, 507 F.3d 435, 438 (6th Cir. 2007) (noting that both temporary
and final general authority Treasury regulations are legally binding); Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v.
United States, 142 F.3d 973, 979 (7th Cir. 1998) (recognizing that all Treasury regulations have
the force of law); E. Norman Peterson Marital Trust v. Comm'r, 78 F.3d 795, 798 (2d Cir. 1996)
("[T]emporary regulations are entitled to the same weight we accord to final regulations.");
Sheldon I. Banoff, Dealing with the "Authorities": Determining Valid Legal Authority in Advising
Clients, Rendering Opinions, Preparing Tax Returns and Avoiding Penalties, 66 TAX NOTES 1072,
1086, 1092 (1988) (noting legal effect of final and temporary Treasury regulations). But see Es-
tate of Gerson v. Comm'r, 127 T.C. 139, 176 (2006) (Vasquez, J., dissenting) (opining that Trea-
sury regulations issued under I.R.C. § 7805 do not carry the force of law).
21 See, e.g., Ellen P. Aprill, The Interpretive Voice, 38 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 2081, 2097 (2005)
(recognizing specific authority Treasury regulations as legislative in character); Irving Salem et
al., ABA Section of Taxation Report of the Task Force on Judicial Deference, 57 TAX LAW. 717,
728 (2004) (same); Juan F. Vasquez, Jr. & Peter A. Lowy, Challenging Temporary Treasury Reg-
ulations: An Analysis of the Administrative Procedure Act, Legislative Reenactment Doctrine,
Deference, and Invalidity, 3 Hous. Bus. & TAX L.J. 248, 250 (2003) (same).
22 According to my study of 232 projects, Treasury claimed that APA § 553 notice-and-
comment rulemaking requirements did not apply and provided no basis for its claim in 190
projects overall; of those 190 projects, 74 cited a specific grant as authority for the regulations
promulgated. See Hickman, supra note 4, at 1749-57 (providing further detail regarding study
results).
23 See id. at 1778-91 (criticizing Treasury's utilization of the good cause exception).
24 Treasury issued final regulations without notice and comment in 11, or 4.7%, of the 232
regulatory projects studied. See id. at 1749. While many such regulations reflect minor house-
keeping efforts, Treasury occasionally skips notice and comment entirely in making arguably
more significant changes. See id. at 1787-89 (noting how, where Treasury skipped notice and
comment in promulgating final regulations, Treasury's reliance on exceptions was generally mis-
placed and inappropriate).
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primary area of noncompliance that I identified, however, stems from
Treasury's frequent issuance of binding, temporary regulations with
only postpromulgation notice and comment. 25
With the usual APA notice-and-comment process, the agency is-
sues a notice of proposed rulemaking with nonbinding proposed regu-
lations, considers public comments received in response, and only
then promulgates final, legally binding regulations. 26 In other words,
regulated parties are only bound by regulations on which they have
previously had an opportunity to comment. When Treasury issues
temporary regulations, by contrast, it typically follows a pattern of is-
suing a notice of proposed rulemaking simultaneously with temporary
regulations, reviewing the resulting postpromulgation comments, and
then finalizing the regulations with or without changes.27 In other
words, Treasury routinely imposes a legal burden upon taxpayers to
conform to regulations before submitting those regulations for public
comment. Though the APA provides exceptions from its public no-
tice-and-comment requirements, I have argued elsewhere that Trea-
sury regulations rarely, if ever, fall within the scope of those
exceptions. 28
For most of these temporary regulations, the finalization process
is a smooth one: Treasury publishes an NPRM in conjunction with the
temporary regulations, receives few or no comments responding to
the notice, and then issues the final regulations with or without
changes some months later.2 9 It is not unusual, however, for Treasury
25 Of the 232 Treasury regulation projects studied, 95, or 40.9%, did not follow the tradi-
tional APA notice-and-comment process. See id. at 1748. Of those 95 projects, 84, or 36.2%,
involved legally binding temporary regulations. See id.
26 See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)-(c) (2000).
27 See, e.g., Guidance Under Section 1502; Application of Section 108 to Members of a
Consolidated Group, T.D. 9192, 70 Fed. Reg. 14,395, 14,395-96 (Mar. 22, 2005) (finalizing regu-
lations and removing temporary regulations issued in T.D. 9089, T.D. 9098, and T.D. 9117);
Information Reporting and Backup Withholding for Payment Card Transactions, T.D. 9136, 69
Fed. Reg. 41,938 (Jul. 13, 2004) (finalizing and removing temporary regulations issued in T.D.
9041); Excise Tax Relating to Structured Settlement Factoring Transactions, T.D. 9134, 69 Fed.
Reg. 41,192 (Jul. 8, 2004) (finalizing and removing temporary regulations issued in T.D. 9042).
28 See Hickman, supra note 4, at 1759-86.
29 See, e.g., Allocation and Apportionment of Deductions for Charitable Contributions,
T.D. 9211, 70 Fed. Reg. 40,661, 40,662 (July 14, 2005) (finalizing temporary regulations without
change after rejecting sole comment as "not appropriate"); Transfers of Compensatory Options,
T.D. 9148, 69 Fed. Reg. 48,392, 48,392 (Aug. 10, 2004) (finalizing temporary regulations without
change after no comments to temporary and proposed regulations were received). In the late
1980s, Congress noted Treasury's habit of issuing but not finalizing temporary regulations and
adopted I.R.C. § 7805(e) invalidating temporary Treasury regulations that are not finalized
within three years. See I.R.C. § 7805(e) (2000); Michael Asimow, Public Participation in the
Adoption of Temporary Tax Regulations, 44 TAX LAW. 343, 363-64 (1991) (discussing history of
1160 [Vol. 76:1153
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to receive significant or extensive comments regarding a temporary
regulation and related NPRM and then to make numerous adjust-
ments to the final regulations in response thereto.30 For some particu-
larly complex matters, Treasury may even issue multiple successive
revisions to the temporary regulations, each along with a new NPRM,
as it receives and considers comments piecemeal. 31
Treasury has denied in the press that it has an APA compliance
problem, though without specifically addressing any of my findings. 32
But, while my study was the first effort to quantify the actual extent of
Treasury's noncompliance with the APA, complaints of Treasury's
rulemaking practices are not new. In 1991, Michael Asimow recog-
nized that Treasury's practices "leave[] in doubt the validity of nu-
merous temporary and final regulations. ' 33  More recently, Juan
Vasquez and Peter Lowy described Treasury's habits as "obliterat[ing]
the APA's notice-and-comment procedures" and "an abuse of the
process as well as an abuse of discretion. ' 34 John Coverdale has ques-
tioned Treasury's regular use of temporary regulations without notice
I.R.C. § 7805(e)); Vasquez & Lowy, supra note 21, at 249-54 (explaining I.R.C. § 7805(e) back-
ground); see also Hickman, supra note 4, at 1738-40 (discussing relationship between I.R.C.
§ 7805(e) and the APA). Congress left in place then-existing temporary regulations, some of
which still remain in the Code of Federal Regulations in temporary form. See, e.g., Treas. Reg.
§§ 1.103(n)-lT, 1.103(n)-2T, 1.103(n)-3T, 1.103(n)-4T, 1.103(n)-5T, 1.103(n)-6T, 1.103(n)-7T
(limiting ability of taxpayers to exclude certain state and local bond interest from taxable income
since 1984); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.892-iT, 1.892-2T, 1.892-3T, 1.892-4T, 1.892-5T, 1.892-6T, 1.892-7T
(elaborating I.R.C. provision exempting certain foreign government and international organiza-
tion income from U.S. taxation since 1988); see also Vasquez & Lowy, supra note 21, at 254
("[T]his 3-year expiration date applies only to temporary regulations issued after November 20,
1988.").
30 See, e.g., Guidance Under Section 355(e); Recognition of Gain on Certain Distributions
of Stock or Securities in Connection with an Acquisition, T.D. 9198, 70 Fed. Reg. 20,279, 20,279
(Apr. 19, 2005) (finalizing temporary regulations with modifications in response to comments
received); Certain Transfers of Property to Regulated Investment Companies [RICs] and Real
Estate Investment Trusts [REITs], T.D. 9047, 68 Fed. Reg. 12,817, 12,817 (Mar. 18, 2003) (same).
31 See, e.g., Guidance Under Section 1502; Application of Section 108 to Members of a
Consolidated Group, T.D. 9192, 70 Fed. Reg. 14,395, 14,395-96 (Mar. 22, 2005) (finalizing and
summarizing history of first, second, and third temporary regulations issued in response to com-
ments); see also Hickman, supra note 4, at 1801-02 (summarizing history of T.D. 9192 and re-
lated temporary regulations as response to United Dominion Indus., Inc. v. United States, 532
U.S. 822 (2001)).
32 See Jeremiah Coder, Study Finds Treasury Isn't Complying with Procedure Act, 116 TAX
NoTEs 636, 637 (Aug. 20, 2007) (quoting a Treasury spokesman stating, "We disagree with Ms.
Hichman's [sic] assessment that we are not following APA guidelines."). For further discussion
of my methodology and findings, see Hickman, supra note 4, at 1740-59.
33 Asimow, supra note 29, at 369-70.
34 See Vasquez & Lowy, supra note 21, at 253-54.
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and comment.35 Juan Lavilla has identified Treasury's misuse of the
good cause exception from notice-and-comment rulemaking as "par-
ticularly remarkable" when compared with other agencies.36
Moreover, these observations do not necessarily represent the
sum of Treasury's noncompliance with the APA. For reasons of man-
ageability, I limited my own study to a handful of easily observable
violations and left for another day more subjective issues such as the
substantive adequacy of Treasury's NPRMs for notifying the public of
Treasury's intentions and of Treasury's responses to significant com-
ments received in promulgating final regulations. 37 In any given
rulemaking effort, Treasury may be susceptible to further procedural
challenges on such grounds as well.
II. Limitations on Pre-enforcement Judicial Review
In many if not most areas of administrative law, a track record
such as Treasury's would be an open invitation for legal challenges by
disgruntled regulated parties. Regulated parties in many areas of ad-
ministrative law have the option of challenging final regulations either
immediately upon promulgation through pre-enforcement review or
after the promulgating agency has undertaken an enforcement ac-
tion.38 APA § 704 provides a cause of action to challenge "final
agency action," which includes issuing temporary as well as final regu-
lations.39 APA § 702 waives sovereign immunity for actions seeking
35 See John F. Coverdale, Chevron's Reduced Domain: Judicial Review of Treasury Regula-
tions and Revenue Rulings After Mead, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 39, 69-70 (2003) ("It is not entirely
clear, however, what justification the Treasury believes it has for not using notice and comment
for temporary regulations that are legislative in the APA sense.").
36 See Juan J. Lavilla, The Good Cause Exemption to Notice and Comment Rulemaking
Requirements Under the Administrative Procedure Act, 3 ADMIN. L.J. 317, 341 (1989).
37 See Hickman, supra note 4, at 1747-48 (discussing limitations of empirical study); see
also, e.g., 1 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 7.3-7.4 (4th ed. 2002)
(elaborating jurisprudence addressing APA notice-and-comment requirements and range of re-
lated challenges).
38 JAMES T. O'REILLY, ADMINISTRATIVE RULEMAKING § 13:1 (2d ed. 2007) ("Pre-en-
forcement injunction actions sometimes are begun the very day that an agency rule is promul-
gated, with a request that the implementation of the rule be enjoined and that the court stay the
effective date of the rule pending outcome of the litigation."); RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR. ET AL.,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS § 5.7.4. (4th ed. 2004) ("In many circumstances, however, a
party displeased with a regulation would prefer to wait and to challenge all aspects of that regu-
lation in a proceeding in which that regulation is applied.").
39 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2000). The Supreme Court has articulated a two-part test for finality
that emphasizes the definitiveness and legal force of the ruling in question. See Bennett v. Spear,
520 U.S. 154, 177-78 (1997) (describing an agency action as final if it "mark[s] the 'consumma-
tion' of the agency's decisionmaking process" and is an action from which "legal consequences
will flow"); see also, e.g., Ctr. for Native Ecosystems v. Cables, 509 F.3d 1310, 1328-31 (10th Cir.
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relief "other than money damages" for any "person suffering legal
wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by
agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute. '40 The Su-
preme Court has interpreted both APA and constitutional standing
requirements to allow pre-enforcement judicial review of many
agency actions.41 Finally, since the Court decided Abbott Laboratories
v. Gardner,42 the courts generally have construed ripeness doctrine to
permit pre-enforcement judicial review of agency regulations inter-
preting a variety of regulatory statutes.43
These APA provisions and judicial interpretations thereof work
together such that a variety of regulated and interested parties can
and do challenge agency regulations-both temporary and final-as
soon as the agency issues them. As a result, pre-enforcement chal-
lenges to final agency regulations have become common, if not the
norm, in many administrative law contexts. 44 A court that finds a reg-
ulation to be invalid pursuant to such a challenge can declare the reg-
2007) (applying Bennett test to evaluate finality under APA § 704); Rattlesnake Coal. v. EPA,
509 F.3d 1095, 1103-04 (9th Cir. 2007) (same). Final Treasury regulations obviously satisfy these
requirements. Whether temporary Treasury regulations satisfy the Court's finality standard is a
closer call, as Treasury's general habit of simultaneously issuing an NPRM requesting post-
promulgation comments signals its intent for further consideration of the regulation's provisions.
Nevertheless, whether or not they explicitly applied the test articulated in Bennett, courts have
repeatedly considered "interim final" regulations carrying legally binding force to be final
agency action for judicial review purposes. See, e.g., Pub. Citizen v. Dep't of Transp., 316 F.3d
1002, 1019 (9th Cir. 2003) (recognizing "interim final" regulation as sufficiently final to support
judicial review), rev'd on other grounds, 541 U.S. 752 (2004); Career Coll. Ass'n v. Riley, 74 F.3d
1265, 1268 (D.C. Cir. 1996) ("'Interim' refers only to the Rule's intended duration-not its ten-
tative nature."); Thrift Depositors of Am., Inc. v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 862 F. Supp. 586,
590 (D.D.C. 1994) (finding procedural challenge to interim final rule adopted without notice and
comment to be justiciable) (citing Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co. v. FERC, 969 F.2d 1141 (D.C. Cir.
1992)).
40 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2000); see also, e.g., Trudeau v. FTC, 456 F.3d 178, 185-87 (D.C. Cir.
2006) (discussing scope of APA § 702 sovereign immunity waiver); High Country Citizens Alli-
ance v. Clarke, 454 F.3d 1177, 1181 (10th Cir. 2006) (limiting scope of waiver where another
statute "precludes judicial review").
41 See, e.g., Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 154 (1967) (observing that plaintiffs
have standing prior to enforcement where they are the subject of regulation and risk penalties if
they fail to comply); Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. United States, 316 U.S. 407, 417-19 (1942)
(recognizing pre-enforcement standing of plaintiffs whose contractual rights and business rela-
tions were adversely impacted by regulations).
42 Abbot Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
43 See id. at 153; see also PIERCE ET AL., supra note 38 § 5.7.3, at 203 (describing pre-
enforcement judicial review of agency regulations as routine). But see A. Raymond Randolph,
Administrative Law and the Legacy of Henry J. Friendly, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 10-11 (1999)
(suggesting that the D.C. Circuit may be narrowing its approach toward pre-enforcement review
of agency regulations).
44 See Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 140.
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ulation invalid, perhaps enjoin enforcement, and tell the agency to
start over.45
Judicial review in tax cases follows a different norm from that in
other areas of administrative law. Taxpayer-initiated tax litigation
generally falls into one of two categories which, for purposes of this
Article, I will term "enforcement-based": refund litigation, where the
taxpayer has paid taxes or penalties allegedly owed and seeks to re-
cover those funds; and deficiency litigation, where the IRS has ex-
amined the taxpayer's tax filings and concluded that taxes or penalties
are due.46 There are several reasons for this phenomenon. The APA
is a general statute. Consequently, its provisions do not trump more
specific provisions regarding judicial review contained in more con-
text-specific statutes.47 Specifically, I.R.C. § 7421,48 often labeled the
Anti-Injunction Act,49 and corresponding language in the Declaratory
45 See, e.g., O'REILLY, supra note 38, § 13:2 ("The typical remedial action is revision of the
rule on remand. When a declaratory judgment invalidating a rule is issued, the matter is sent
back to the agency for reconsideration, often with instructions for specific activity or a schedule
for compliance."). Courts sometimes employ the lesser remedy of remanding a flawed regula-
tion to the agency without vacating it. See, e.g., Checkosky v. SEC, 23 F.3d 452, 466 (D.C. Cir.
1994) (listing D.C. Circuit cases remanding without vacating agency actions); see generally Ron-
ald M. Levin, "Vacation" at Sea: Judicial Remands and the APA, 21 ADMIN. & REo. L. NEWS 4
(1996) (summarizing issues surrounding the practice of remanding without vacating); Daniel B.
Rodriguez, Of Gift Horses and Great Expectations: Remands Without Vacatur in Administrative
Law, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 599, 624-35 (2004) (criticizing the practice).
46 See GERALD A. KAFKA & RITA A. CAVANAGH, LITIGATION OF FEDERAL CIVIL TAX
CONTROVERSIES § 1.01 (2d ed. 1995) (dividing tax litigation generally into the refund and defi-
ciency categories). In using the term "enforcement-based" here, my principal intention is to
distinguish refund or deficiency actions stemming from a dispute over the liability of a single
taxpayer from "pre-enforcement" actions that would challenge Treasury regulations immediately
postpromulgation. Of course, refund actions do not precisely entail IRS "enforcement" in the
same way that deficiency actions do. Yet both refund actions and deficiency actions typically
revolve around the IRS conclusions about the application of the laws to the circumstances of a
particular taxpayer, rather than merely disputing more generally the substantive or procedural
validity of a regulation. See generally PIERCE ET AL., supra note 38, § 5.7.4 (discussing tactical
considerations in pursuing pre-enforcement and enforcement-based judicial review).
47 See, e.g., Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550-51 (1974) ("Where there is no clear
intention otherwise, a specific statute will not be controlled or nullified by a general one, regard-
less of the priority of enactment.").
48 I.R.C. § 7421 (2000).
49 See, e.g., Comm'r v. Shapiro, 424 U.S. 614, 616 (1976) (using Anti-Injunction Act label);
Laing v. United States, 423 U.S. 161, 166 (1976) (same); We the People Found., Inc. v. United
States, 485 F.3d 140, 142 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (same). Courts also occasionally refer to I.R.C. § 7421
as the Tax Anti-Injunction Act. See, e.g., South Carolina v. Regan, 465 U.S. 367, 385 (1984)
(O'Connor, J., concurring); Nat'l Trust for Historic Pres. v. FDIC, 21 F.3d 469, 472 (D.C. Cir.
1994) (per curiam); Estate of Johnson v. United States, 836 F.2d 940, 948 (5th Cir. 1988). I.R.C.
§ 7421 is not the only statute commonly bearing the Anti-Injunction Act label. See, e.g., Hibbs v.
Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 102 (2004) (using the Anti-Injunction Act term for 28 U.S.C. § 1341); Raygor
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Judgment Act ("DJA")50 limit the timing of challenges to the tax laws.
The courts have responded to these provisions by taking a restrictive
approach to other justiciability questions in tax cases.
A. LR.C. § 7421 and the Declaratory Judgment Act
I.R.C. § 7421 and the DJA offer the first and most significant ob-
stacle to pre-enforcement review of Treasury regulations. I.R.C.
§ 7421(a) provides generally that "no suit for the purpose of re-
straining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in
any court by any person, whether or not such person is the person
against whom such tax was assessed."'5' The same provision contains
several narrow exceptions limited to their particular circumstances,
most procedural 52 but a few substantive in nature.53
Correspondingly, the DJA contains a tax exception that prevents
courts from providing declaratory relief for controversies "with re-
spect to Federal taxes. ' 54 Again, the statute provides a few narrow
v. Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 534 U.S. 533, 549 n.1 (2002) (applying the Anti-Injunction Act
label to 28 U.S.C. § 2283). To avoid confusion in this Article, therefore, I will simply refer to this
provision as I.R.C. § 7421 except when directly quoting another source.
50 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2000).
51 I.R.C. § 7421(a).
52 For example, I.R.C. § 7421(a) allows judicial review if the IRS tries to collect taxes
claimed without first mailing a notice of deficiency to the taxpayer. See id. (establishing I.R.C.
§ 6212(a) as exception); id. § 6212(a) (authorizing notices of deficiency by certified or registered
mail); id. § 6213(a) (precluding assessment without notice of deficiency); Martinez v. IRS, 78
A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 96-6129, 96-6130 (E.D. La. 1996) (enjoining IRS from levying wages or
assessing taxes where notices of deficiency were not sent).
53 For example, I.R.C. § 7421(a) allows taxpayers to seek Tax Court review of IRS deter-
minations of whether or not a person is an employee for employment tax purposes. See I.R.C.
§ 7421(a) (creating exception for circumstances falling within the scope of I.R.C. § 7436); id.
§ 7436 (governing proceedings for employment status determinations). Still other provisions of-
fer additional exceptions, such as for determinations regarding the qualification of retirement
plans for specified tax treatment, see id. § 7476(a) (permitting Tax Court review of IRS determi-
nations regarding qualification of retirement plans under subchapter D of I.R.C. chapter 1); id.
§§ 401-36 (subchapter D of I.R.C. chapter 1, governing deferred compensation arrangements
including retirement plans), or whether interest on municipal bonds will be tax-exempt, see id.
§ 7478(a) (permitting Tax Court review of IRS declarations regarding applicability of I.R.C.
§ 103 to certain State and local government obligations); id. § 103(a) (excluding State and local
bond interest from gross income generally).
54 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2000). The DJA stands in contrast to 28 U.S.C. § 1346, which gives
both federal district courts and the United States Court of Federal Claims jurisdiction over:
Any civil action against the United States for the recovery of any internal-revenue
tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, or any pen-
alty claimed to have been collected without authority or any sum alleged to have
been excessive or in any manner wrongfully collected under the internal-revenue
laws.
Id. § 1346(a)(1).
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exceptions, for certain tax matters in bankruptcy cases 55 or regarding
certain entities' qualification for tax-exempt status.56 The courts have
generally interpreted I.R.C. § 7421 and the DJA as coextensive. 57
The legislative history of I.R.C. § 7421 does little to elucidate the
congressional intent behind its enactment.58 Nevertheless, the Su-
preme Court has identified the purpose of I.R.C. § 7421 and the DJA
as "to permit the United States to assess and collect taxes alleged to
be due without judicial intervention, and to require that the legal right
to the disputed sums be determined in a suit for refund," assuring the
United States the "prompt collection of its lawful revenue. ' 59 Consis-
tent with these recognized purposes, the courts have interpreted
I.R.C. § 7421 and the DJA as imposing a general rule of "pay first,
litigate later. ' 60 Correspondingly, most cases barred by I.R.C. § 7421
55 See id. § 2201(a) (allowing declaratory judgments regarding certain tax liabilities in
bankruptcy cases under 11 U.S.C. §§ 505 and 1146); 11 U.S.C. §§ 505, 1146 (2000).
56 See 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (permitting declaratory judgments in cases concerning determi-
nations under I.R.C. § 7428(a)); I.R.C. § 7428(a). Congress adopted both I.R.C. § 7428 and the
corresponding language in the DJA subsequent to the Supreme Court's decisions in Bob Jones
University v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725 (1974), and Alexander v. "Americans United" Inc., 416 U.S. 752
(1974). See infra note 69 and accompanying text; Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1306(a), (b)(8), 90 Stat.
1520 (1976).
57 See, e.g., Ambort v. United States, 392 F.3d 1138, 1140 (10th Cir. 2004) ("In practical
effect, these two statutes are coextensive .... "); Sigmon Coal Co. v. Apfel, 226 F.3d 291, 300-01
(4th Cir. 2000) ("[T]he two statutory texts are, in underlying intent and practical effect, coexten-
sive." (quoting In re Leckie Smokeless Coal Co., 99 F.3d 573, 583 (4th Cir. 1996))); Nat'l Taxpay-
ers Union v. United States, 68 F.3d 1428, 1435 (D.C. Cir. 1995) ("Because the AIA and DJA
operate coterminously, the following analysis of the impact of the AIA upon NTU's complaint
also determines the effect of the DJA."); see also 1 LAURENCE F. CASEY, FEDERAL TAX PRAC-
TICE § 2:47 (2d ed. Supp. 2007) (observing that the language of the DJA seems "more compre-
hensive" than I.R.C. § 7421, but that "[tihere is considerable authority ... that the two statutes
are 'coterminous' or in pari materia"). The Supreme Court thus far has declined to equate
I.R.C. § 7421 and the DJA but has recognized the lower courts' treatment and opined that "the
federal tax exception to the Declaratory Judgment Act is at least as broad as the prohibition of
the [Tax] Anti-Injunction Act." "Americans United" Inc., 416 U.S. at 759 n.10; see also Bob
Jones Univ., 416 U.S. at 732 n.7 (1974) (same). The IRS meanwhile takes the position that the
DJA is broader than I.R.C. § 7421. See IRS, Litigation Guideline Memorandum GL-52, 1991
WL 1167968, at *4 (June 28, 1991).
58 See Note, Enjoining the Assessment and Collection of Federal Taxes Despite Statutory
Prohibition, 49 HARV. L. REV. 109, 109 & n.9 (1935) (documenting limits of I.R.C. § 7421's
history); Bob Jones Univ., 416 U.S. at 736 (same). But see ROGER FOSTER & EVERETT V. AB-
BOT, A TREATISE ON THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX UNDER THE ACT OF 1894 § 72 (1895) (sug-
gesting that Congress adopted similar language in 1867 after several taxpayers requested
injunctions against the assessment or collection of the Civil War income tax).
59 Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co., 370 U.S. 1, 7 (1962); see also Hibbs v.
Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 103 (2004) (summarizing judicial acceptance of same purposes); South Caro-
lina v. Regan, 465 U.S. 367, 386 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (acknowledging and elaborat-
ing same purposes); "Americans United" Inc., 416 U.S. at 769 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (same).
60 See Bryan T. Camp, The Equal Protection Problem in Innocent Spouse Procedures, 112
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and the DJA reflect unsurprising applications of these statutory limi-
tations against, for example, tax protesters raising frivolous legal argu-
ments already rejected by the courts61 or taxpayers asserting
technicalities to avoid levies or property seizures for taxes clearly
owed.62 Even where the taxpayer frames its argument as a constitu-
tional challenge rather than a tax claim, the courts have declined to
adopt a general exception from I.R.C. § 7421 and the DJA, concluding
(probably rightly) that such an exception would quickly swallow the
rule.63
Yet, the Court also currently interprets I.R.C. § 7421 and DJA
limitations broadly to preclude pre-enforcement review of tax cases
raising questions far beyond the individual liabilities of taxpayer plain-
tiffs or related efforts by the IRS to collect particular assessments.64
In particular, the Supreme Court has recognized the words "for the
purpose of" in I.R.C. § 742165 and "with respect to" in the DJA66 as
extending to claims with only indirect bearing upon the flow of tax
revenues to the government, regardless of the merits of the issues
TAX NOTES 281, n.7 (July 17, 2006) (reviewing history of I.R.C. § 7421 and characterizing that
provision and the Supreme Court's interpretation thereof as adopting a "pay-first, litigate-later
structure").
61 See, e.g., Shrock v. United States, 92 F.3d 1187, 1996 WL 414177, at *1 (7th Cir. 1996)
(unpublished table decision) (calling tax protestor's claims "frivolous" and "repeatedly re-
jected"); Gassei v. DOJ, 968 F.2d 19, 1992 WL 149981, at *2 (10th Cir. 1992) (unpublished table
decision) (rejecting taxpayer's argument as clearly contrary to controlling circuit precedent);
Purk v. United States, 895 F.2d 1414, 1990 WL 12188, at *1 (6th Cir. 1990) (unpublished table
decision) (observing that "other courts have rejected similar claims" to that raised by taxpayer).
62 See, e.g., Weiler v. United States, 82 F.3d 424, 1996 WL 169254, at *4 (9th Cir. 1996)
(unpublished table decision) (finding record "replete with evidence" that the Government's as-
sessments were valid, and that taxpayers demonstrated no particularized hardship); Nuttle v.
IRS, 69 F.3d 548, 1995 WL 643106, at *2 (10th Cir. 1995) (unpublished table decision) (declining
to enjoin collection of taxes recognized as due by the Tax Court so that taxpayer could avoid
posting an appeal bond); Knight v. United States, 992 F.2d 1219,1993 WL 140589, at *2 (9th Cir.
1993) (unpublished table decision) (refusing to find irreparable harm and enjoin collection for
lack of deficiency notice where I.R.C. did not require notice).
63 See, e.g., "Americans United" Inc., 416 U.S. at 759 ("[Dlecisions of this Court make it
unmistakably clear that the constitutional nature of a taxpayer's claim ... is of no consequence
under the Anti-Injunction Act."); Church of Scientology of Cal. v. United States, 920 F.2d 1481,
1488-89 (9th Cir. 1990) ("No special consideration is granted to injunctions against tax collection
sought on constitutional grounds."); Lowrie v. United States, 824 F.2d 827, 830 (10th Cir. 1987)
("Nor can one avoid [I.R.C. § 7421] by raising constitutional claims."). Cf. United States v.
Clintwood Elkhorn Mining Co., 128 S. Ct. 1511, 1520 (2008) (reiterating lack of constitutional
exception to I.R.C. § 7421 in declining to recognize such exception from administrative exhaus-
tion requirement of I.R.C. § 7422).
64 See I CASEY, supra note 57, § 2:36 (observing that I.R.C. § 7421 limits judicial review in
virtually all cases regarding a taxpayer's own tax liability).
65 I.R.C. § 7421 (a) (2000).
66 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2000).
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raised. For example, in Bob Jones University v. Simon, a private uni-
versity sought injunctive and declaratory relief from an IRS threat to
withdraw its tax-exempt status due to its race-based admission poli-
cies. 67 The Supreme Court noted that the University's petition would
have the effect of "restrain[ing] the collection of taxes" not from the
University itself but rather "from its donors" by "forc[ing] the [IRS]
to continue to provide advance assurance to those donors that contri-
butions to [the University] will be recognized as tax deductible,
thereby reducing their tax liability. '68 In other words, because the
University's request, if granted, would have the effect of reducing the
taxes of its contributors, I.R.C. § 7421 applied.69
The lower courts have followed the Supreme Court's lead, re-
jecting pre-enforcement judicial review of Treasury regulations
whether or not they directly related to the individual liabilities of the
taxpayers bringing suit. In Foodservice and Lodging Institute v. Re-
gan, the court concluded that regulations governing how restaurant
employers allocate and report tip income among employees "plainly
concern[ed] the assessment or collection of federal taxes" of the em-
ployees, and thus that I.R.C. § 7421 and the DJA precluded pre-en-
forcement judicial review.70 In Debt Buyers' Ass'n v. Snow,71 the court
decided that regulations requiring information reporting by the pur-
chasers of delinquent consumer loans could not be reviewed because
the regulations would help the IRS determine whether other taxpay-
ers should recognize gross income from discharged debt: "any action
that hinders the IRS in determining the accuracy of [gross reported]
67 Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 725 (1974).
68 Id. at 739.
69 Id. at 739 & n.10, 749-50; see also Alexander v. "Americans United" Inc., 416 U.S. 752,
760-61 (1974) (employing similar reasoning to reach comparable conclusion regarding organiza-
tion's exempt status: "Under any reasonable construction of the statutory term 'purpose,' the
objective of this suit was to restrain the assessment and collection of taxes from respondent's
contributors."). Congress has since amended the I.R.C. and the DJA to permit declaratory relief
with respect to the exempt status of taxpayers such as Bob Jones University and "Americans
United" Inc. See I.R.C. § 7428(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a); see also supra note 56 (discussing enact-
ment of these provisions). This statutory relief is limited to exempt status determinations, how-
ever, and does not otherwise alter the breadth of the Court's interpretation of I.R.C. § 7421. See
I.R.C. § 7428(a).
70 Foodservice & Lodging Inst. v. Regan, 809 F.2d 842, 844 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (emphasis
added). The Ninth Circuit reached the same conclusion regarding a similar challenge involving
information returns allegedly required under ERISA. See California v. Regan, 641 F.2d 721, 722
(9th Cir. 1981).
71 Debt Buyers' Ass'n v. Snow, 481 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2006).
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income will in fact hinder the assessment and collection of
taxes .... ",72
Nevertheless, in addition to the statutory exceptions from I.R.C.
§ 7421 and the DJA that Congress has explicitly adopted, the courts
have recognized one class of cases as outside the textual scope of
I.R.C. § 7421 as well as the DJA and thus not subject to the limitations
of those provisions. In the 1970s and early 1980s, courts concluded
that these provisions did not apply in several cases in which plaintiffs
challenged tax benefits extended to other taxpayers, on the ground
that the suits, if successful, would allow the IRS to increase tax reve-
nues, as opposed to restraining assessments and collections. 73 More
recently, in Hibbs v. Winn, a case concerning the interpretation of 28
U.S.C. § 1341 with respect to federal court consideration of state tax
litigation, the Supreme Court acknowledged these cases favorably in
dicta, analogizing the statute under consideration with I.R.C. § 7421. 74
Yet, as is discussed further below, courts in several cases have gone on
to reject many such challenges on more general justiciability
grounds.75
The courts have also recognized two common law exceptions to
I.R.C. § 7421. Just as the courts read I.R.C. § 7421 broadly, however,
they construe both of these judicially developed exceptions very nar-
rowly. In Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co., the Supreme
Court held that a taxpayer may only avoid these statutory limitations
72 Id. at 9.
73 Most of these cases address third-party challenges to IRS determinations that various
not-for-profit entities were entitled to tax-exempt status. See, e.g., E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org. v.
Simon, 506 F.2d 1278, 1284-85 (D.C. Cir. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 426 U.S. 26 (1976);
Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc. v. Regan, 544 F. Supp. 471, 489-90 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), rev'd on
other grounds sub norn. U.S. Catholic Conference v. Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc., 487
U.S. 72 (1988); Lugo v. Simon, 453 F. Supp. 677, 690 (N.D. Ohio 1978), rev'd in part on other
grounds sub nor. Lugo v. Miller, 640 F.2d 823 (6th Cir. 1981); McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F.
Supp. 448, 453-54 (D.D.C. 1972). Some such cases, however, involve other tax benefits. See,
e.g., Tax Analysts & Advocates v. Shultz, 376 F. Supp. 889, 891-94 (D.D.C. 1974) (challenging
IRS application of I.R.C. § 2503(b) gift tax exclusion to congressional campaign contributions in
Rev. Rul. 72-355).
74 Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 103-04 (2003). The dissenters in Hibbs questioned the
Court's interpretation of both I.R.C. § 7421's text and those earlier cases, noting that the lan-
guage and holdings in those cases were consistent with the separate exception from I.R.C. § 7421
that the Court subsequently adopted in South Carolina v. Regan. See id. at 119-21 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting); South Carolina v. Regan, 465 U.S. 367, 378-82 (1984); see also infra notes 90-94 and
accompanying text.
75 See, e.g., Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 44-46 (1975) (declining
jurisdiction over such a challenge on standing grounds); Fulani v. Brady, 935 F.2d 1324, 1328-31
(D.C. Cir. 1991) (same); Am. Soc'y of Travel Agents, Inc. v. Blumenthal, 566 F.2d 145, 148 (D.C.
Cir. 1977) (same).
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and challenge a tax if: (1) "under no circumstances could the Govern-
ment ultimately prevail," and (2) "the taxpayer would suffer irrepara-
ble injury if collection were effected. '76  Only taxpayers who can
satisfy both of these factors may seek pre-enforcement review.77
A taxpayer satisfies the first of the two elements only if the "IRS
flouted the express terms of the Code, or lacked any factual basis for
the assessment of taxes against an individual taxpayer, '7 8 or "it
is ... apparent that, under the most liberal view of the law and the
facts, the United States cannot establish its claim." 79 The government
must assert its claim against the taxpayer with specificity beyond the
"mere good-faith allegation of an unpaid tax." 80 But, beyond that, the
burden is on the taxpayer to demonstrate that there are no circum-
stances under which the government can win. 81 Williams Packing it-
self involved a question whether a company that furnished boats to
fishing captains who then hired their own crews was in fact the em-
ployer of the fisherman and thus liable for social security and unem-
ployment taxes. 82  The Court found jurisdiction barred,
notwithstanding that a liability assessment would bankrupt the com-
pany, because the government's liability claim was not obviously mer-
itless.83 With little difficulty, the Court has found other, subsequent
cases similarly wanting, and their claims thus barred from judicial
review.8 4
76 Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co., 370 U.S. 1, 7 (1962).
77 See, e.g., Alexander v. "Americans United" Inc., 416 U.S. 752, 758 (1974) ("Unless both
conditions are met, a suit for preventive injunctive relief must be dismissed."). Courts occasion-
ally speak of the two prongs of the Williams Packing exception disjunctively as separate excep-
tions. See, e.g., Martens v. United States, No. 05-1805, 2007 WL 2007580, at *5 (D.D.C. July 6,
2007). I have yet to locate a case that actually applied one prong without the other to find
jurisdiction, suggesting that such references may in fact reflect imprecise rhetoric rather than
doctrinal interpretation.
78 Inv. Annuity, Inc. v. Blumenthal, 609 F.2d 1, 5-6 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (citation omitted).
See, e.g., Comm'r v. Shapiro, 424 U.S. 614, 627-29, 633 (1976) (finding irreparable injury and
requiring the Government on remand "to litigate the question whether its assessment has a basis
in fact").
79 Williams Packing, 370 U.S. at 7; see also Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 737
(1974) (same).
80 Shapiro, 424 U.S. at 629.
81 See Williams Packing, 370 U.S. at 7-8. The Supreme Court subsequently held that the
government must provide sufficient basis for its assessment to give the taxpayer the opportunity
to satisfy this burden. See Shapiro, 424 U.S. at 627-29.
82 See Williams Packing, 370 U.S. at 3-4.
83 See id. at 6-8.
84 See, e.g., United States v. Am. Friends Serv. Comm., 419 U.S. 7,10 (1974) (per curiam)
(agreeing with taxpayers' concession that government's position would likely prevail); Bob Jones
Univ., 416 U.S. at 748-49 (declaring merits of taxpayer's claims "sufficiently debatable").
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Of course, in the vast majority of tax cases, one would expect the
government's positions to be at least colorable, thus rendering the
Williams Packing exception inapplicable based solely upon its first
prong. Nevertheless, the Court has also paid significant attention to
the second element of the Williams Packing exception, whether the
taxpayer would suffer irreparable harm from being denied equitable
relief. In evaluating this element, the Court has emphasized repeat-
edly the taxpayer's opportunity to pay taxes assessed and then sue for
a refund.85 While recognizing this option as suboptimal practically,
the Court nevertheless has declined to find irreparable harm in light
of that alternative path to judicial review.86
Given the exception's requirements and the Court's application
thereof, it is perhaps unsurprising that the Court has never actually
applied Williams Packing to find jurisdiction over a case. 87 Following
the Court's lead, the lower courts typically only apply the Williams
Packing exception to find jurisdiction in rare cases of obvious and
egregious IRS error or flagrant IRS disregard of established law com-
bined with significant financial imposition upon the taxpayer.88 Even
85 See, e.g., Am. Friends Serv. Comm., 419 U.S. at 11; Alexander v. "Americans United"
Inc., 416 U.S. 752, 762 (1974).
86 See, e.g., Am. Friends Serv. Comm., 419 U.S. at 11; "Americans United" Inc., 416 U.S. at
762; Bob Jones Univ., 416 U.S. at 747-48.
87 The closest the Court has come to employing the Williams Packing exception in the
taxpayer's favor was in Commissioner v. Shapiro, 424 U.S. 614 (1976). In that case, the Court
found that the IRS's retention without judicial review of funds the taxpayer otherwise needed to
make bail represented an irreparable injury. See id. at 633. The Court was unable to reach a
conclusion from the record before it regarding the Government's potential for prevailing on the
merits, however, because the IRS had declined to state the basis of its assessment. See id. at 632.
While acknowledging that subsequent developments in the case since the time of filing could
render the Williams Packing exception inapplicable, the Court nevertheless remanded the case in
effect so that the district court could assemble a record for the purpose of evaluating the applica-
bility of I.R.C. § 7421 and the Williams Packing exception. See id. at 633-34 & n.15. Separately,
in South Carolina v. Regan, the Court denied the applicability of the Williams Packing exception
but found jurisdiction under a different theory. See South Carolina v. Regan, 465 U.S. 367,
378-80 (1984); see also infra notes 90-94 and accompanying text. Otherwise, the Court has
merely declined to find jurisdiction under the Williams Packing exception. See, e.g., Am. Friends
Serv. Comm., 419 U.S. at 10 (recognizing taxpayers' concession that the Williams Packing excep-
tion did not apply, but discussing its inapplicability due to availability of alternative legal remedy
in any event); "Americans United" Inc., 416 U.S. at 763 (holding Williams Packing exception
inapplicable); Bob Jones Univ., 416 U.S. at 749 (finding exception inapplicable).
88 My research here was not exhaustive. According to Westlaw, the Court's opinion in
Williams Packing has been cited in more than 1,400 judicial opinions as of June 2008. A review
of roughly 100 federal appellate cases decided in the past twenty years for which Westlaw as-
signed between two and four Keycite stars revealed only three in which the reviewing court
applied the Williams Packing exception to find jurisdiction, all of which involved postenforce-
ment claims of obvious and egregious IRS error or disregard of established law. See Estate of
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where the regulation at issue imposes information reporting or other
requirements that do not necessarily implicate the immediately af-
fected parties' own tax liabilities, thus limiting their ability to pay a
disputed tax and sue for a refund, the lower courts have drawn from
the Court's irreparable harm rhetoric to conclude that such parties do
not qualify for the Williams Packing exception because they can
choose not to comply with the regulation, pay any resulting penalties,
and then seek a refund of those amounts.89
South Carolina v. Regan provides the other judicially recognized
exception from I.R.C. § 7421.90 This case involved a suit by South
Carolina over amendments to I.R.C. § 103 limiting the exemption
from gross income for interest on certain state bond issuances. 91 The
State requested declaratory and injunctive relief and argued both that
the amendments were unconstitutional and also that complying with
the amendments would adversely impact its ability to price and sell its
bonds.92 In granting the requested relief, the Court noted that, unlike
the taxpayers in Williams Packing and its progeny, South Carolina did
not have the alternative of complying and suing for a refund.93 Agree-
ing with the State, the Court held that I.R.C. § 7421 does not apply to
preclude pre-enforcement judicial review if there is no other legal
remedy available.94
As with the Williams Packing exception, however, courts applying
the South Carolina v. Regan exception have done so very sparingly.
Courts generally accept the argument that taxpayers who wish to chal-
lenge Treasury regulations have the option of paying the tax and suing
for a refund. 95 In cases involving information filings requirements
Michael v. Lullo, 173 F.3d 503, 505, 512-13 (4th Cir. 1999) (granting Williams Packing exception
where IRS illegally denied credit to compensate for its own calculation error discovered after the
limitations period for adjusting the assessment had expired); Lampert v. United States, 884 F.2d
1395, 1989 WL 104459, at *1-3 (9th Cir. 1989) (unpublished table decision) (applying Williams
Packing exception where assessed penalty was both very large and obviously miscalculated);
Ponchik v. Comm'r, 854 F.2d 1127, 1130-32 (8th Cir. 1988) (extending Williams Packing excep-
tion where IRS audit file clearly showed IRS error in case of federal prisoner trying to support
minor child).
89 See, e.g., California v. Regan, 641 F.2d 721, 723 (9th Cir. 1981) (denying applicability of
Williams Packing exception on such grounds).
90 South Carolina v. Regan, 465 U.S. 367, 367 (1984).
91 See id. at 370-71.
92 See id. at 370-72.
93 See id. at 373, 378-81
94 See id. at 378, 380-81.
95 See SEC v. Credit Bancorp, Ltd., 297 F.3d 127, 139 (2nd Cir. 2002) (finding South Caro-
lina v. Regan exception inapplicable because "the Receiver, like any other taxpayer, has the
option of paying taxes immediately and seeking a refund thereafter. The 'pay first, litigate later'
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rather than taxes due, courts say that taxpayers can decline to follow
the regulation and then sue for a refund of any resulting penalties. 96
Some courts recognize the potential for nonenforcement, and thus
nonreviewability, particularly with respect to information filing re-
quirements, but are untroubled by that possibility.97 For example, in
the Debt Buyers' case discussed above, the court suggested that, "[i]f
the IRS consequently chooses not to assess penalties for such non-
compliance ... , Debt Buyers will have suffered no harm, irreparable
or otherwise, and thus would have no basis for injunctive relief."'98
Regardless, the jurisprudence on the Williams Packing and South
Carolina v. Regan exceptions renders their availability for APA proce-
dural challenges against Treasury regulations unlikely. Case law inter-
preting many APA rulemaking procedural requirements-the line
between legislative and interpretative rules,99 the applicability of the
good cause exception,100 or whether a NPRM provides adequate no-
tice, to name a few examplesol-is simply too variable to make re-
procedure is not unusual." (citing Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247, 260 (1935); Phillips v.
Comm'r, 283 U.S. 589, 595-99 (1931))); Nat'l Taxpayers Union, Inc. v. United States, 68 F.3d
1428, 1436 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (denying applicability of South Carolina v. Regan exception to litiga-
tion of tax claims by taxpayer membership organizations because "the taxpayer mem-
bers ... have 'alternative remedies"'); In re Am. Bicycle Ass'n, 895 F.2d 1277, 1281 & n.4 (9th
Cir. 1990) (rejecting the applicability of South Carolina v. Regan exception because taxpayers
could pay taxes owed and sue for refund).
96 See, e.g., Foodservice & Lodging Inst., Inc. v. Regan, 809 F.2d 842, 844-45 (D.C. Cir.
1987) (per curiam) ("[E]mployers can refuse to comply, pay the statutory fine, and sue for a
refund of the fine. Therefore, it is clear that alternative remedies are available."); California v.
Regan, 641 F.2d 721, 723 (9th Cir. 1981) (concluding that California had a legal remedy because
it could pay penalties for noncompliance with information reporting requirements and sue for a
refund thereof); Debt Buyers' Ass'n v. Snow, 481 F. Supp. 2d 1, 10 (D.D.C. 2006) (denying
applicability of South Carolina v. Regan exception for same reason).
97 See infra notes 140-143 and accompanying text (regarding deficiency actions).
98 Debt Buyers' Ass'n, 481 F. Supp. 2d at 10.
99 See, e.g., Am. Mining Cong. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 1108 (D.C.
Cir. 1993) ("The distinction between those agency pronouncements subject to APA notice-and-
comment requirements and those that are exempt has been aptly described as 'enshrouded in
considerable smog."' (citation omitted)); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Distinguishing Legislative Rules
from Interpretative Rules, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 547, 548 (2000) ("[T]he case law in this area is
characterized by a great deal of unnecessary confusion and inconsistency.").
100 See, e.g., Lavilla, supra note 36, at 416 (recognizing an "absence of uniform case law"
regarding the good cause exception); Ellen R. Jordan, The Administrative Procedure Act's
"Good Cause" Exemption, 36 ADMIN. L. REV. 113, 120 (1984) (describing the "ad hoc quality"
of good cause exception analysis as courts "examine each claim in context, weighing all the facts
and circumstances to decide whether other legitimate interests outweigh the desirability of pro-
viding an opportunity for public participation in rulemaking").
101 See, e.g., 1 PIERCE, supra note 37, § 7.3 (observing with regard to adequacy of notice
question that "[gleneralization is difficult because the resolution of any particular dispute of this
type is critically dependent on the specifics of the dispute").
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view of Treasury's practices sufficiently clear-cut to satisfy Williams
Packing. Perhaps as a result, the few cases in which the courts have
considered the applicability of I.R.C. § 7421 and the DJA to APA pro-
cedural challenges have more or less assumed the unavailability of the
Williams Packing exception and focused instead on South Carolina v.
Regan, though again typically without finding jurisdiction. 10 2
B. General Justiciability Limitations as Backstops
Legal scholars have argued that judicial application of jus-
ticiability doctrines such as standing and ripeness does not occur in a
vacuum, but rather is often influenced by judicial perceptions regard-
ing the availability or wisdom of particular remedial options.10 3 The
vast majority of pre-enforcement tax cases fall to I.R.C. § 7421 and
the DJA. As a result, the courts rarely address more general jus-
ticiability issues such as standing or ripeness in dealing with tax con-
troversies. Nevertheless, several judicial opinions that do tread such
ground reinforce the unavailability of pre-enforcement judicial review
for Treasury regulations by accepting what appears to be a more re-
strictive view of standing or ripeness doctrine in tax cases as opposed
to other areas of administrative law. In other words, consistent with
scholarly expectations, the limitations posed by I.R.C. § 7421, the
DJA, and judicial interpretations thereof have created a climate that
simply disfavors allowing courts to remedy legal wrongs in the tax
context through pre-enforcement review. Thus, in this climate, even
where courts might be inclined to interpret I.R.C. § 7421 and the DJA
to allow pre-enforcement APA procedural challenges against Treasury
regulations to proceed, they may nevertheless decline jurisdiction on
other more general grounds.
Other than I.R.C. § 7421 and the DJA, constitutional standing re-
quirements have proven the biggest obstacle to pre-enforcement re-
102 See, e.g., Foodservice and Lodging Inst., Inc. v. Regan, 809 F.2d 842, 844 (D.C. Cir.
1987) (rejecting South Carolina v. Regan exception and omitting discussion of Williams Packing
exception); California v. Regan, 641 F.2d 721, 723 (9th Cir. 1981) (rejecting Williams Packing
exception because "the government did prevail in the district court" before evaluating whether
California had an available legal remedy).
103 See, e.g., DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, THE DEATH OF THE IRREPARABLE INJURY RULE 220-22
(1991) (describing ripeness and mootness as at least implicitly remedial); Richard H. Fallon, Jr.,
The Linkage Between Justiciability and Remedies-And Their Connections to Substantive Rights,
92 VA. L. REV. 633, 643 (2006) ("Implicit judgments about appropriate judicial remedies exert
an important, almost pervasive influence on justiciability doctrines."); Laura E. Little, It's About
Time: Unravelling Standing and Equitable Ripeness, 41 BuFF. L. REV. 933, 947 (1993) (criticizing
the Supreme Court for "collaps[ing] analysis of jurisdictional and remedial concerns into a single
threshold enterprise").
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view in tax cases, though more for third parties who object to policies
reflected in IRS interpretations than for taxpayers concerned about
their own tax liabilities. 10 4 Standing doctrine derives from the "cases"
or "controversies" requirement of Article III of the United States
Constitution. 10 5 Ordinarily, to have constitutional standing to bring a
claim in federal court, a plaintiff must establish both an "injury in
fact" and a causal connection between that injury and the defendant's
conduct, and also demonstrate that a decision by the courts in her
104 The cases to which I refer here should not be confused with the substantial line of
jurisprudence regarding what is known as "taxpayer standing" doctrine. Cases involving taxpay-
ers attempting to use their taxpayer status to challenge various federal government policies are
both plentiful and virtually always dismissed as nonjusticiable. See, e.g., Hein v. Freedom from
Religion Found., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2553, 2559, 2563 (2006); Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams.
United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 482-83 (1982); United States v.
Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 174-75 (1974); see also Nancy C. Staudt, Taxpayers in Court: A Sys-
tematic Study of a (Misunderstood) Standing Doctrine, 52 EMORY L.J. 771, 804-13 (2003) (docu-
menting empirically poor record of federal taxpayer standing challenges). Occasionally one of
these cases objects particularly to IRS action, or at least casts its claim in those terms. See, e.g.,
Bartley v. United States, 123 F.3d 466, 470-71 (7th Cir. 1997) (challenging alleged IRS overcol-
lection of taxes but on basis that government was improperly spending tax revenues). Usually,
however, the objections raised more directly concern government programs not directly related
to revenue collection policies. See, e.g., Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2559-60 (challenging President's
Faith-Based and Community Initiatives Program as Establishment Clause violation); Valley
Forge Christian Coll., 454 U.S. at 468-69 (objecting to sale of property by Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare to religious college). Hence, notwithstanding the label, taxpayer stand-
ing cases generally have little to do with tax law or APA procedural requirements.
105 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2562; Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S.
Ct. 1438, 1464 (2007). Generally speaking, pre-enforcement tax challenges may only be filed in
the Article III courts because the Tax Court is empowered primarily to hear cases after the IRS
has issued a deficiency notice to a taxpayer. See I.R.C. §§ 6213, 6214 (2000); see also KAFKA &
CAVANAGH, supra note 46, § 2.01 (listing other, more limited areas of Tax Court jurisdiction).
Nevertheless, there is some disagreement over whether the Article III case or controversy limi-
tation applies to the Tax Court as an Article I court. Although the United States Tax Court is an
Article I or legislative court of otherwise limited jurisdiction, standing doctrine applies equally to
tax cases arising in that forum. See, e.g., Freytag v. Comm'r, 501 U.S. 868, 897 (1991) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (recognizing that Article III jurisdictional questions should apply to non-Article III
tribunals as well); Clapp v. Comm'r, 875 F.2d 1396, 1399 (9th Cir. 1989) ("[T]he few cases dis-
cussing the differences between the Tax Court and an Article III court indicate that questions of
Tax Court jurisdiction are to be resolved in the same manner as for an Article III court.");
Anthony v. Comm'r, 66 T.C. 367, 368-69 (1976) ("[Wlhether as part of the conceptual formula-
tion of a 'case' or 'controversy' or as a matter of prudent policy considerations, we think the
'standing' doctrine inheres in our exercise of judicial power."). But see Baranowicz v. Comm'r,
432 F.3d 972, 975 (9th Cir. 2005) ("Moreover, we must also bear in mind that the Tax Court is
not an Article III court and, therefore, is not fully constrained by Article III's case or contro-
versy limitation."); Leandra Lederman, Precedent Lost. Why Encourage Settlement, and Why
Permit Non-Party Involvement in Settlements?, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 221, 248 (1999) ("Arti-
cle I courts are not constrained by the 'case or controversy' clause of Article III of the
Constitution.").
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favor will likely redress that injury. 10 6 In particular, the injury in ques-
tion must be "concrete and particularized" and "actual or imminent,"
as opposed to "conjectural or hypothetical."' 1 7
In the context of procedural challenges, however, the courts ap-
ply a modified standing analysis that deemphasizes both redressability
and the immediacy aspect of injury in fact. 10 8 Plaintiffs alleging that
they have been denied procedural protections need only demonstrate
a link between the procedure and substantive agency action in ques-
tion. 0 9 Requiring such plaintiffs to prove that procedural adherence
would actually change the outcome of the agency's rule, for example,
would render APA requirements "a dead letter." 1 0 Thus, for exam-
ple, in Dismas Charities, Inc. v. U.S. Department of Justice, the court
found that an organization that ran community correction centers was
sufficiently injured to raise a procedural challenge against a policy,
adopted by the Bureau of Prisons ("BOP") without notice and com-
ment, that would have reduced the number of prisoners eligible for
confinement in such institutions."' "If applicable, [the procedural re-
quirements of notice and comment prior to rulemaking] give Dismas
the chance to argue to the BOP that its policy is wrong before the
policy is adopted, and Dismas's interest in continuing to provide ser-
vices to the BOP is certainly concrete.' ' 1 2
Employing these rules, courts in a variety of administrative con-
texts have granted not just regulated parties but a wide range of inter-
106 Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-81
(2000); Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 167 (1997); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,
560-61 (1992).
107 Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 180.
108 See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1453 (2007) ("When a litigant is vested
with a procedural right, that litigant has standing if there is some possibility that the requested
relief will prompt the injury-causing party to reconsider the decision that allegedly harmed the
litigant."); Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7 ("The person who has been accorded a
procedural right to protect his concrete interests can assert that right without meeting all the
normal standards for redressability and immediacy."); Sugar Cane Growers Coop. of Fla. v.
Veneman, 289 F.3d 89, 94-95 (D.C. Cir. 2002) ("A [litigant] who alleges a deprivation of a proce-
dural protection to which he is entitled never has to prove that if he had received the procedure
the substantive result would have been altered. All that is necessary is to show that the procedu-
ral step was connected to the substantive result.").
109 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. at 1453; Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 573 n.8;
Sugar Cane Growers Coop. of Fla., 289 F.3d at 94-95.
Ito Sugar Cane Growers Coop. of Fla., 289 F.3d at 95.
111 Dismas Charities, Inc. v. DOJ, 401 F.3d 666, 677 (6th Cir. 2005); see also Hodges v.
Abraham, 300 F.3d 432, 443-44 (4th Cir. 2002) (finding that potential environmental damage to
State land and water represented sufficiently concrete injury to allow Governor of South Caro-
lina to sue Department of Energy on procedural grounds).
112 Dismas Charities, 401 F.3d at 677.
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est groups and their members standing to challenge agency
regulations on both substantive and procedural grounds.'1 3 Neverthe-
less, plaintiffs raising procedural challenges still must demonstrate
that the agency's substantive action has caused a personal and particu-
larized injury.'14 In Wisconsin Public Power, Inc. v. FERC,115 for ex-
ample, the court concluded that utilities that purchase power from
power transmission grids were at best indirectly and speculatively im-
pacted by an agency order levying service charges upon the transmis-
sion grid owners, and thus were insufficiently injured to raise an APA
procedural challenge against the order, because the agency had not
authorized the transmission grid owners to pass through the service
charges to their customers, including the appellants." 16
Taxpayers suffering increased tax liabilities or expanded informa-
tion reporting requirements imposed by Treasury regulations would
seem easily to possess the sort of personal and particularized injury
necessary to challenge those regulations for their failure to satisfy
APA rulemaking requirements under this relaxed approach to stand-
ing. Yet "[i]t is well-recognized that the standing inquiry in tax cases
is more restrictive than in other cases.1 117 Hence, parties asserting in-
juries other than their own tax liabilities have generally been unsuc-
cessful in challenging Treasury and IRS rules and regulations, even on
procedural grounds.
The leading case on the issue, Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare
Rights Organization, involved a case brought by indigent rights orga-
nizations and their members against a revenue ruling granting exempt
status to hospitals that only offered emergency care to persons unable
to pay." 8 The plaintiffs alleged both that the IRS's ruling violated the
I.R.C. and also that the IRS should have followed the notice-and-com-
113 See, e.g., Ouachita Watch League v. Jacobs, 463 F.3d 1163, 1170-73 (11th Cir. 2006)
(holding that group of environmental organizations had standing to challenge Forest Service
plans for failure to comply with National Environmental Policy Act and National Forest Man-
agement Act); Kootenai Tribe of Idaho v. Veneman, 313 F.3d 1094, 1109-14 (9th Cir. 2002)
(recognizing standing of state, counties, Indian tribe, recreational groups, and others to raise
National Environmental Policy Act and APA challenges); Kelley v. Selin, 42 F.3d 1501, 1507-10
(6th Cir. 1995) (finding that landowners had standing to challenge Nuclear Regulatory Commis-
sion waste storage rulemaking).
114 See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572 n.10 (1992) (offering exam-
ples of what is or is not a sufficiently concrete injury); Wis. Pub. Power, Inc. v. FERC, 493 F.3d
239, 269 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Tex. Indep. Producers & Royalty Owner Ass'n v. EPA, 410 F.3d 964,
976-77 (7th Cir. 2005) (summarizing precedent illustrating concrete injuries).
115 Wis. Pub. Power, Inc. v. FERC, 493 F.3d 239 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
116 Id. at 269.
117 Nat'l Taxpayers Union, Inc. v. United States, 68 F.3d 1428, 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
118 Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 28 (1975).
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ment requirements of APA § 553 in adopting its interpretation." 9 Al-
though the IRS asserted I.R.C. § 7421 and the DJA as limitations, 20
the Court dismissed the case for lack of standing, deeming the connec-
tion between the IRS's ruling and the denial of services too specula-
tive to sustain judicial review.' 2' Concurring in the judgment of the
Court, Justice Stewart added, "I cannot now imagine a case, at least
outside the First Amendment area, where a person whose own tax
liability was not affected ever could have standing to litigate the fed-
eral tax liability of someone else. ' 122 Following the Court's guidance,
the lower courts have since declined to grant standing in a series of
cases challenging the tax-exempt status of groups unrelated to the
plaintiffs.123
Nevertheless, it is unclear whether standing doctrine limits pre-
enforcement challenges by taxpayers who challenge Treasury regula-
tions that purportedly impact their own tax liabilities or otherwise im-
pose direct burdens upon them. Very few cases even address the
question, and those that do reflect inconsistent outcomes. In National
Taxpayers Union, Inc. v. United States, for example, the D.C. Circuit
found that a taxpayer organization had standing on behalf of individu-
ally aggrieved taxpayer members to raise a pre-enforcement constitu-
tional challenge against the retroactivity of a congressionally enacted
tax rate increase.1 24 Yet, in Stephenson v. Brady, the Fourth Circuit
concluded that a taxpayer who sought declaratory relief on both sub-
stantive and procedural grounds from Treasury regulations allegedly
requiring him to file certain information returns suffered no injury
and thus lacked standing until such time as the IRS actually assessed a
penalty against him for failing to file the returns. 125 The courts' rea-
119 Id. at 33-34.
120 Id. at 34-35.
121 See id. at 37, 42-46. Notably, the court below decided that the plaintiffs' claim fell
outside the scope of I.R.C. § 7421 and the DJA because "the litigation did not threaten to deny
anticipated tax revenues to the Government." E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org. v. Simon, 506 F.2d
1278, 1284-85 (D.C. Cir. 1974). The court's reasoning was consistent with several cases from the
1970s holding that I.R.C. § 7421 and the DJA do not apply to third-party challenges to another
organization's exempt status. See supra note 64 and accompanying text (discussing this line of
cases).
122 Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. at 46 (Stewart, J., concurring).
123 See, e.g., Fulani v. Brady, 935 F.2d 1324, 1326-28, 1331 (D.C. Cir. 1991); In re U.S.
Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d 1020, 1028-31 (2d Cir. 1989).
124 Nat'l Taxpayers Union, Inc. v. United States, 68 F.3d 1428, 1435 (D.C. Cir. 1995). How-
ever, the court separately found that I.R.C. § 7421 and the DJA barred the case in question. See
id. at 1435-38.
125 Stephenson v. Brady, 927 F.2d 596, 1991 WL 22835, at *2 (4th Cir. 1991) (per curiam)
(unpublished table decision).
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soning in these cases is simply inadequate to establish any clear pat-
tern of analysis.
Regardless, where standing limitations do not preclude pre-en-
forcement judicial review, ripeness doctrine may. Like standing, ripe-
ness doctrine is a manifestation of the Article III cases or
controversies requirement. 126 Ripeness doctrine is designed "to pre-
vent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from
entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over administrative
policies, and also to protect the agencies from judicial interference un-
til an administrative decision has been formalized and its effects felt in
a concrete way by the challenging parties.1 27 The test for ripeness
requires a reviewing court to consider two elements: (1) "the fitness of
the issues for judicial decision" and (2) "the hardship to the parties of
withholding court consideration. 1 2 8  The fitness inquiry looks to
whether the question presented is "definite and concrete" rather than
"hypothetical or abstract. ' 12 9 Hardship, in turn, requires a plaintiff to
have suffered a legal wrong.130 In administrative contexts such as this
one, the Court often rephrases these criteria as follows: "(1) whether
delayed review would cause hardship to the plaintiffs; (2) whether ju-
dicial intervention would inappropriately interfere with further ad-
ministrative action; and (3) whether the courts would benefit from
further factual development of the issues presented. '131
The standard for establishing ripeness often requires a regulated
party to suffer the consequences of enforcement or the denial of a
benefit before seeking judicial review. 132 Nevertheless, the case an-
126 See Nat'l Park Hospitality Ass'n v. Dep't of the Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 808 (2003).
127 Id. at 807-08 (quoting Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-49 (1967)); accord
Ohio Forestry Ass'n, Inc. v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726, 732-33 (1998) (same).
128 Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967); accord Whitman v. Am. Trucking
Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 479 (2001) (quoting Abbott Labs.); Ohio Forestry Ass'n, 523 U.S. at 733
(same).
129 Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat'l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298 (1979).
130 See Ohio Forestry Ass'n, 523 U.S. at 733 (defining traditional hardship as "adverse ef-
fects of a strictly legal kind").
131 Id. at 733; see also Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. at 479-80 (quoting Ohio Forestry
Ass'n to evaluate ripeness).
132 See, e.g., Nat'l Park Hospitality Ass'n, 538 U.S. at 810-11 ("Petitioner's argument ap-
pears to be that mere uncertainty as to the validity of a legal rule constitutes a hardship for
purposes of the ripeness analysis.... If we were to follow petitioner's logic, courts would soon
be overwhelmed with requests for what essentially would be advisory opinions ...."); Reno v.
Catholic Soc. Servs., 509 U.S. 43, 57-59 (1993) (requiring parties to pursue administrative appli-
cation of regulation against them to deny government benefits before permitting judicial review
of regulation); Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 891-94 (1990) (declining to find chal-
lenges to agency regulation ripe absent further agency action applying the regulation).
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nouncing the modern ripeness standard-Abbott Laboratories v.
Gardner-also established a broad presumption in favor of early judi-
cial review of agency regulations that directly affect primary behav-
ior.133 The Court has more recently carved back on this doctrine,
indicating, for example, that pre-enforcement review may be more ap-
propriate for regulations imposing burdens rather than conferring
benefits.13 4 Court precedent is also mixed on whether a statute that
provides an alternative path to judicial review precludes pre-enforce-
ment consideration of regulatory challenges. 135 Nevertheless, particu-
larly where a regulated party faces a choice between complying with
regulatory requirements and risking penalties for their violation, the
courts have generally been sympathetic toward pre-enforcement
review.136
Few tax cases address the ripeness question. Those that do tend
to be so situational as to defy easy analogy. Nevertheless, a few
demonstrate the potential relevance of ripeness doctrine in pre-en-
forcement challenges to Treasury and IRS regulations and rules. In
Stephenson v. Brady, for example, in addition to finding that the tax-
payer lacked standing, the court concluded that his case was not
ripe.137 Although the issues that the taxpayer raised were purely legal
and thus arguably fit for judicial review, the court concluded that the
taxpayer suffered no hardship unless and until the IRS assessed and
he had to pay penalties for his failure to file the information returns in
question. 138 Moreover, the court considered the "inconvenience and
133 Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 139-41 (1967) (recognizing general presumption
in favor of pre-enforcement review of agency regulations in APA); see also Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n,
497 U.S. at 891 (labeling as ripe for review "a substantive rule which as a practical matter re-
quires the plaintiff to adjust his conduct immediately"); Toilet Goods Ass'n v. Gardner, 387 U.S.
158, 164 (1967) (designating as ripe cases in which "the impact of the administrative action could
be said to be felt immediately by those subject to it in conducting their day-to-day affairs").
134 See Catholic Soc. Servs., 509 U.S. at 58-59.
135 Compare Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 212, 216 (1994) (distinguishing
Abbott Labs. and finding that statutory procedures for administrative and judicial review pre-
clude consideration of pre-enforcement challenge), with Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 141-42 (con-
cluding that existence of statutory procedures for administrative review did not preclude pre-
enforcement challenges and simply provided "an additional remedy"). See also 1 PIERCE, supra
note 37, § 15.14, at 1079-81 (noting the inconsistency between these cases).
136 See Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 152-53 (allowing judicial review where plaintiffs faced
choice between complying with labeling requirements at significant financial cost and incurring
criminal and civil penalties); Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. United States, 316 U.S. 407, 417-19
(1942) (allowing judicial review where plaintiffs had to comply with costly rules or risk losing
broadcasting license).
137 Stephenson v. Brady, 927 F.2d 596, 1991 WL 22835, at *3-4 (4th Cir. 1991) (per curiam)
(unpublished table decision).
138 See id. at *4.
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relatively minor expense" of complying with the regulation and filing
the returns not a cognizable injury worthy of judicial concern.1 39
In sum, as interpreted by the courts, I.R.C. § 7421 and the DJA
bar most pre-enforcement judicial review of Treasury regulations and
other IRS rulings. To the extent those provisions do not, however, the
courts are likely to employ more general limitations such as standing
and ripeness to foreclose pre-enforcement review. The cases that sur-
mount these obstacles are few and far between, leaving enforcement-
based litigation as virtually the only path to judicial review of Trea-
sury's procedural failings.
III. Limitations on Enforcement-Based Judicial Review
The lack of a pre-enforcement litigation option alone does not
explain why taxpayers rarely challenge Treasury regulations on proce-
dural grounds. After all, the courts' routine denial of pre-enforce-
ment tax claims generally is predicated, under one doctrine or
another, on the notion that taxpayers have the option of paying tax, or
alternatively declining to adhere to the law in question and paying any
penalties assessed, and then suing for a refund. In the case of defi-
ciency actions, this judicial posture assumes that taxpayers can simply
wait for the IRS to seek enforcement of the tax laws through a notice
of deficiency and then take the case to the Tax Court. 140 The courts
suffer no shortage of tax refund and deficiency cases. Yet, still, these
cases tend not to raise APA procedural challenges.
While procedural requirements serve important normative objec-
tives of their own, from the perspective of the typical regulated party,
procedural challenges are merely a means for achieving a different,
more substantive goal: influencing the government's interpretation of
the relevant statute. Taxpayers want substantive regulations that will
inure to their benefit, or at least not apply to their detriment, whether
in their impact upon liabilities for taxes due, obligations to collect and
report information to the IRS, or otherwise. Under the tax law's cur-
rent enforcement-based litigation regime, successfully prosecuting a
procedural challenge against an unfavorable Treasury regulation
seems substantially less likely to accomplish the desired substantive
139 See id.
140 As already noted, most taxpayer-initiated tax litigation falls into the enforcement-based
categories of refund litigation or deficiency litigation. See KAFKA & CAVANAGH, supra note 46,
§ 1.01 (dividing most tax litigation into the refund and deficiency categories); see also supra note
46, explaining use of "enforcement-based" terminology in reference to refund and deficiency
litigation.
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end than a procedural claim raised pre-enforcement, for several
reasons.
Contrary to the courts' suggestion and apparent belief, getting to
enforcement-based judicial review of Treasury regulations is not quite
as simple as paying the tax and suing for a refund. Limiting judicial
review to refund and deficiency actions means that many potential
regulatory challenges never find their way into court. The reasons for
this are largely pragmatic, though again doctrine plays a role: a poten-
tially costly administrative process that a taxpayer must pursue prior
to seeking judicial review; 41 a certain degree of futility that would
likely accompany many challenges to temporary Treasury regulations
finalized before judicial review could be obtained;142 and the unclear
implications of judicial deference doctrines for challenges brought in
an enforcement-based context.
Both foes and defenders of pre-enforcement judicial review of
agency rulemaking efforts agree that an enforcement-based review re-
gime will likely curtail facial challenges against agency regulations. 43
The tax system seems to offer at least one case that proves their point.
Many taxpayers undoubtedly elect to comply with or rearrange their
affairs to avoid regulations that they find questionable, rather than put
themselves through the effort of raising a challenge, placing them-
selves in a negative enforcement position or operating indefinitely in a
state of uncertainty regarding tax noncompliance and the potential
consequences.
141 See, e.g., Quarty v. United States, 170 F.3d 961, 971-72 (9th Cir. 1999) (describing ad-
ministrative requirements and declining to consider merits because claim "was not administra-
tively exhausted").
142 See supra note 25 and accompanying text (recognizing Treasury's use of temporary reg-
ulations as its most obvious APA compliance problem).
143 See, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw, Improving the Environment of Agency Rulemaking: An Essay
on Management, Games, and Accountability, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 185, 225-28 (1994)
(arguing with approval that regulated parties are more likely to comply with agency regulations
if bringing a pre-enforcement challenge risks a penalty); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to
Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L. REv. 59, 90-91 (1995) (expressing concern that
eliminating pre-enforcement judicial review would "induce regulatees to comply with a rule,
even if they believe the rule to be invalid, rather than to take the risks attendant to noncompli-
ance and a subsequent challenge to the validity of the rule in an enforcement case"); Mark
Seidenfeld, Playing Games with the Timing of Judicial Review: An Evaluation of Proposals to
Restrict Pre-enforcement Review of Agency Rules, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 85, 100-01 (1997) (agreeing
with predictions that, in the absence of pre-enforcement review, many regulated parties will
simply choose to comply, and expressing concerns about negative consequences of that
outcome).
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A. The Path to Judicial Review: Refund Claims and Deficiency
Notices
To pursue judicial review either through refund litigation or defi-
ciency litigation, a taxpayer must first pursue an agency-level process
dictated by the I.R.C. Depending upon the circumstances of the indi-
vidual case, these processes may or may not be involved or compli-
cated. Regardless, each raises a certain threshold obstacle to
obtaining judicial review that may deter taxpayers from pursuing that
course.
Refund actions arise after a taxpayer requests a refund of taxes
(or occasionally penalties) paid and the IRS either rejects that claim
or fails to act on the refund within six months.144 The jurisdictional
theory in such cases is that the taxpayer has paid the full tax or pen-
alty that the IRS has assessed, has been injured by that payment, and
is claiming a refund thereof.
Deficiency litigation is a consequence of (1) the IRS concluding
that a taxpayer owes additional taxes or penalties and issuing a statu-
tory notice of deficiency to that effect, and (2) the taxpayer respond-
ing by filing a suit contesting the notice with the Tax Court.1
45
Jurisdiction in such cases is not predicated on the payment of the tax
or penalty assessed; rather, Congress has authorized taxpayers to file
claims in Tax Court upon receipt of a deficiency notice. 146
Courts declining jurisdiction under I.R.C. § 7421 and the DJA
tend particularly to emphasize the availability of refund actions.147
From the above description, the refund claims process sounds simple
enough: the taxpayer can simply file the refund request and wait for
the IRS's rejection or for six months to pass, whichever comes first.
Indeed, some refund claims are just that straightforward. They must
be filed on the proper form within the proper time frame and include
144 See I.R.C. § 7422(a) (2000) (precluding a suit to recover taxes paid until the taxpayer
has filed a refund claim and exhausted administrative penalties); see also id. § 6532(a)(1) (al-
lowing a suit under I.R.C. § 7422(a) either six months after filing a refund claim or when the IRS
rejects to such a request, whichever comes first); Brennan v. Sw. Airlines Co., 134 F.3d 1405,
1412 (9th Cir. 1998) (recognizing administrative exhaustion requirement for refund claim).
145 See I.R.C. §§ 6211(a), 6212(a), 6213(a) (defining "deficiency," authorizing notices of de-
ficiency, and authorizing taxpayers to file a petition with the Tax Court after receiving the
notice).
146 See id. § 6213(a). In addition to challenging the noticed deficiency, a taxpayer may as-
sert further in its Tax Court petition that it has overpaid its taxes for the year in question. See id.
§ 6512(b).
147 See, e.g., supra note 95 and accompanying text.
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an adequate description of each issue.148 Issues not properly raised in
the refund claim cannot be raised later in court.149
The IRS has identified certain types of refund claims as subject to
summary rejection, for example, those that raise constitutional issues
or are untimely filed, enabling taxpayers with such claims to obtain
judicial review that much more quickly. 50 Further, taxpayers filing a
refund claim based solely on contested issues arising from tax returns
that the IRS has already examined, if they are eager to get to court,
can include with their claim a request for immediate disallowance,
which the IRS may grant without further review of the claim's
merits.151
For most taxpayers, however, the refund claim process is much
less simple. Refund claims raising interpretive questions are subject
to a more involved administrative process. Unless the IRS summarily
rejects a refund claim, IRS officials generally subject refund claims to
the same sort of administrative examination as when a taxpayer's re-
turn is audited. 152 In pursuing such examinations, the IRS often looks
beyond the specific issues raised in the refund claim in the hope of
identifying offsetting deficiencies. 153 Refund claims that exceed $2
148 See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 601.105(e)(1) (as amended in 1987) (describing form of refund
claim); 3 CASEY, supra note 57, §§ 10.51, 10.54 (describing the required forms and contents for
refund claims); Myron C. Baum, How to Handle a Tax Controversy at the IRS and in Court, C573
A.L.I.-A.B.A. 239, 241-48 (1990) (describing forms, contents, and timing requirements for re-
fund claims).
149 See Treas. Reg. § 301.6402-2(b)(1) (as amended in 1982). Commonly known as the
"doctrine of variance," the courts apply this rule as a jurisdictional requirement. See, e.g., IA 80
Group, Inc. & Subsidiaries v. United States, 347 F.3d 1067, 1074 (8th Cir. 2003); Apollo Fuel Oil
v. United States, 195 F.3d 74, 77 (2d Cir. 1999).
150 The circumstances triggering automatic denial of a refund claim vary slightly depending
on the context. See, e.g., INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL § 4.23.13.4 (2003) (employment tax con-
text); id. § 4.24.8.8 (excise tax context); see also KAFKA & CAVANAGH, supra note 46, § 14.01
(listing most common circumstances triggering automatic refund claim denial in all contexts);
Donald C. Alexander & Brian S. Gleicher, IRS Procedures: Examinations and Appeals, 623-2d
Tax Mgmt. (BNA), at A-111-12 (2006) (same).
151 The initial IRS news release announcing this policy limited the availability of immediate
refund claim disallowance to "contested income, estate or gift tax issues considered in previously
examined returns." Internal Revenue News Release IR-1600, 9 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH)
6609 (Apr. 26, 1976). The current Internal Revenue Manual also recognizes the availability of
immediate disallowance in the employment tax context. See INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL
§ 4.23.13.4 (2003). See also 15 MERTENS LAw OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 58.33 (recog-
nizing expedited processing option); KAFKA & CAVANAGH, supra note 46, § 14.04 (same).
152 See Treas. Reg. § 601.105(e)(2) (as amended in 1987) (prescribing same procedure for
general audits and examination of refund claims); KAFKA & CAVANAGH, supra note 46, § 14.01
(noting that refund claims not summarily rejected are subject to general audit standards); 3
CASEY, supra note 57, § 10.62 (same); Alexander & Gleicher, supra note 150, at A-Ill (same).
153 See KAFKA & CAVANAGH, supra note 46, § 14.01; 3 CASEY, supra note 57, § 10.62.
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million are further subject to review by Congress's Joint Committee
on Taxation. 54
Taxpayers with entirely legitimate complaints regarding the valid-
ity of a particular Treasury regulation may be justifiably wary of sub-
jecting themselves to the equivalent of an audit. Even conscientious
taxpayers may have returns with "soft spots"-items of income or de-
duction where the law is unclear and the related tax liability thus is
susceptible to challenge and recalculation notwithstanding the tax-
payer's best efforts at compliance. Many taxpayers may conclude that
the possible costs of having an IRS examiner identify other issues and
claim underpayment overwhelm the potential benefits of raising a
procedural challenge.
Moreover, as noted, the goal for most taxpayers is not merely to
see a procedurally flawed Treasury regulation invalidated on those
grounds. Rather, most taxpayers are seeking a particular substantive
outcome with respect to their tax liability and the proper tax treat-
ment of their circumstances. One way to accomplish that goal may be
to persuade a court to invalidate a Treasury regulation as procedurally
invalid, requiring Treasury to pursue additional notice-and-comment
procedures and giving the taxpayer an opportunity to present its posi-
tion to Treasury in that context.1 55 Yet, in pursuing that outcome, a
taxpayer may be presented with another option that achieves a finan-
cially similar (or close enough) substantive result: settlement.
IRS examiners do not have the authority to grant refunds in di-
rect contravention of express regulatory mandates or to consider the
relative strength or weakness of the government's position and the
corresponding hazards of litigation in reaching conclusions regarding
the appropriate disposition of the cases before them.1 56 If an IRS ex-
aminer and the taxpayer disagree on the merits of the issues underly-
154 See I.R.C. § 6405(a) (2000); Treas. Reg. §§ 301.6405-1 (as amended in 1978), 601.108 (as
amended in 1980). The $2 million threshold for Joint Committee review was adjusted upward
over time, from $1 million in 2000 and $100,000 in 1976. See Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 1(a)(7), 114
Stat. 2763, 2763 (2000); Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 11834(a), 104 Stat. 1388 (1990); Pub. L. No. 94-
455, § 1210(a)-(b), 90 Stat. 1520, 1711 (1976); see also Alexander & Gleicher, supra note 150, at
A-114-15. In most cases, the Joint Committee accepts the judgment of the Appeals Division,
but occasionally the Joint Committee will question the Appeals Division's handling of a refund
claim. See Alexander & Gleicher, supra note 150, at A-115.
155 Indeed, giving regulated parties the opportunity to vindicate their interests through the
proper application of procedural requirements is rather the point of the relaxed requirements for
establishing standing to challenge agency violations of procedural rights. See supra notes
109-113 and related text.
156 See, e.g., INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL § 4.10.7.5.3.1(5) (2006) (denying IRS examiners
the authority to consider hazards of litigation in reaching conclusions about case resolution); 1
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ing a refund claim, however, the taxpayer has the option of pursuing
an administrative appeal of the examiner's determination. 157 IRS Ap-
peals officers, in turn, do possess the authority to consider the hazards
of litigation and pursue settlements accordingly, even for a mere per-
centage of the tax liability in question. 158 Settlement agreements are
confidential.159 Thus, an IRS Appeals officer facing a taxpayer with a
colorable substantive argument and a procedural challenge against a
Treasury regulation could settle the case without opening the flood-
gates for copycat claims.
Settlements are generally more likely with IRS Appeals officers
than the Department of Justice after a refund action has been filed in
court, giving taxpayers an incentive to pursue an internal IRS appeal
prior to seeking judicial review.160 Moreover, a taxpayer who success-
fully pursues an IRS-level appeal has an opportunity to obtain some
reimbursement for administrative costs and fees from the govern-
ment-an option not available for a taxpayer who chooses instead to
CASEY, supra note 57, § 3.51 (noting that on issues "involving principles laid down in the regula-
tions, rulings or other expressions of [IRS] policy .... the examiner must follow official policy").
157 See Treas. Reg. §§ 601.103(c)(1) (as amended in 1984), 601.105(c)-(d) (as amended in
1987), 601.106(b) (as amended in 1987) (recognizing taxpayer's opportunity to dispute liability
before IRS Appeals Office); 3 CASEY, supra note 57, § 10.62 (discussing taxpayer's right to pur-
sue internal IRS appeal for disagreements with IRS examiner over refund claim issues).
158 See INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL § 8.6.4.1 (2007) ("The Appeals mission is to resolve
tax controversies, without litigation, on a basis which is fair and impartial to both the Govern-
ment and the taxpayer .... A fair and impartial resolution is one which reflects on an issue-by-
issue basis the probable result in event of litigation, or one which reflects mutual concessions for
the purpose of settlement based on relative strength of the opposing positions where there is
substantial uncertainty of the result in event of litigation."); see also 1 CASEY, supra note 57,
§ 4.13 (describing Appeals Division mission similarly); Alexander & Gleicher, supra note 150, at
A-79, A-98-99 (noting that the purpose of the Appeals Division "is to resolve as many issues as
possible without trial and to resolve them promptly" and describing different bases upon which
Appeals settles cases); Richard Lavoie, Analyzing the Schizoid Agency: Achieving the Proper
Balance in Enforcing the Internal Revenue Code, 23 AKRON TAX J. 1, 10 (2008) (observing that
the "primary function" of Appeals Officers "is to settle cases," which often includes "splitting
the issue on a percentage basis"). But see Lavoie, supra, at 10 n.50 (observing that "Appeals
officers generally refuse to settle any issue on a percentage basis where they believe the taxpayer
has less than a 20% chance of success on the merits ... to dissuade nuisance settlements").
159 See I.R.C. § 6103(a) (2000) (precluding IRS disclosure of return information); id.
§ 6103(b)(2) (defining "return information" as including a wide array of taxpayer information,
including tax liabilities or deficiencies and "whether the taxpayer's return was ... examined or
subject to other investigation or processing, or any other data ... collected by the Secretary with
respect to a return or with respect to the determination of the existence, or possible existence, of
liability").
160 See Gregory P. Mathews, Using Negotiation, Mediation, and Arbitration to Resolve IRS-
Taxpayer Disputes, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. REsOL. 709, 723-27 (2004); Theodore D. Peyser,
Refund Litigation, 631-2d Tax Mgmt. (BNA), at A-41 (2003) (discussing settlement policies of
DOJ Tax Division).
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go straight to court.161 Settlements do not establish precedent, so a
taxpayer with a recurring interpretive issue may prefer to litigate
rather than settle a particular claim.162 Taxpayers with nonrecurring
interpretive questions and colorable procedural challenges for non-
recurring interpretive questions, however, may be better served by
raising related procedural claims in the IRS's internal appeals process
than by seeking immediate IRS disallowance of their refund requests
and filing suit based upon Treasury's procedural failings.163
For that matter, in the context of corporations, taxpayers and IRS
officials often negotiate and resolve debatable issues even before the
taxpayer files a tax return. 164 Like settlement agreements, the results
of these negotiations are confidential. 165 These programs work to fur-
ther reduce the number of challenges to questionable Treasury inter-
pretations of the I.R.C. for their procedural flaws as well as the
government's exposure to litigation over controversial or questionable
Treasury regulations. If a taxpayer can reach a satisfactory compro-
mise with IRS officials regarding the substance of its tax liability, ei-
ther before filing a return or while pursuing a refund claim, then the
taxpayer has little incentive to pursue litigation challenging a ques-
tionable regulation.
Still, for some Treasury regulations that taxpayers may wish to
challenge, a refund action is not a readily available option. For exam-
ple, Treasury regulations requiring third-party information reporting
in the Debt Buyers' case impose burdens other than the payment of a
161 See I.R.C. § 7430(a)-(b)(1) (offering prevailing taxpayers the possibility of recovering
reasonable administrative and litigation costs incurred in connection with the determination or
refund of taxes, interest, or penalties, but only if the taxpayer first exhausts administrative reme-
dies within the IRS); Treas. Reg. § 301.7430-1(b) (as amended in 2003) (including Appeals office
conference among the administrative remedies that a taxpayer must exhaust to recover costs
under I.R.C. § 7430).
162 See Lederman, supra note 105, at 254 n.211 ("A 'full concession' by the IRS might leave
the taxpayer open to subsequent disputes with the IRS in other years if the issue is a recurring
one, so the taxpayer might prefer to reject the concession and litigate in order to obtain a
precedent.").
163 See KAFKA & CAVANAGH, supra note 46, § 14.01 (comparing taxpayer options).
164 At least two programs specifically allow this: the Advance Pricing Agreement and the
Prefiling Agreement Program ("PFA"). See Rev. Proc. 96-53, 1996-2 C.B. 375 ("The [Advance
Pricing Agreement] process is designed to be a flexible problem-solving process, based on coop-
erative and principled negotiations between taxpayers and the Service."); Rev. Proc. 2005-12,
2005-02 I.R.B. 311 ("[The PFA] permits a taxpayer . . . to request that the Service examine
specific issues relating to tax returns before those returns are filed."); see also Sheryl Stratton,
IRS Issues First Report on Prefiling Agreements, 91 TAX NOTES 198, 198-99 (2001) (summarizing
initial PFA program results).
165 See Stratton, supra note 164, at 198 (describing Congress as "exempting PFAs from
public disclosure").
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tax liability. 166 Courts denying pre-enforcement review of such regula-
tions have emphasized that an employer or other third party who be-
lieves a regulatory information filing requirement is inconsistent with
the I.R.C. may choose not to file and raise a challenge upon being
assessed and paying penalties for that choice.167 Other taxpayers may
simply lack the financial means to pay contested taxes so that they can
assert a refund claim, so they must resort to deficiency litigation to
bring a procedural challenge against a regulation giving rise to the
alleged liability. In short, these taxpayers need the IRS to initiate an
enforcement action before they can even begin working their way
through the administrative process and seeking judicial review, and
thus are essentially reduced to noncompliance with the law in the
hope of prompting enforcement.
Yet, declining to file a return or choosing not to comply with a
Treasury regulation in filing a tax return will not automatically lead
IRS officials to pursue enforcement. The United States tax system
operates generally on the basis of voluntary reporting. In other
words, the IRS relies upon taxpayers to calculate their tax liabilities,
file their tax returns, and pay their taxes when due.168 Failing to in-
clude items of income reported to the IRS by third parties or failing to
file a return at all where one is required may prompt IRS investiga-
tion. 169 Except for basic computational checks and cross-comparisons
166 See Debt Buyers' Ass'n v. Snow, 481 F. Supp. 2d 1, 6, 9 (D.D.C. 2006).
167 See, e.g., Foodservice & Lodging Inst. v. Regan, 809 F.2d 842, 844-45 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(per curiam); California v. Regan, 641 F.2d 721, 723 (9th Cir. 1981); see also supra note 38 and
accompanying text.
168 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 6011(a) (2000) (requiring persons liable for taxes under the I.R.C. to
file tax returns in accordance with Treasury regulations and forms); id. § 6151(a) (requiring pay-
ment of tax without assessment, notice, or demand by the IRS); see also id. § 6001 (requiring
taxpayers to keep financial records related to tax liability computation); id. § 6702 (imposing a
frivolous return penalty for returns that omit "information on which the substantial correctness
of the self-assessment may be judged" or contain "information that on its face indicates that the
self-assessment is substantially incorrect," if such a return is "due to ... a position which is
frivolous, or... a desire ... to delay or impede the administration of Federal income tax laws").
169 The IRS follows a program of electronically comparing tax returns filed by taxpayers
with income information received from third parties to identify potential underreporting of taxa-
ble income. See, e.g., INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL § 4.19.2.1 (2003) (describing Automated
Underreporter); see also Nushin S. Huq, Panelists Discuss Automated Matching System Changes,
Innocent Spouse Form, 26 TAX MGMT. WKLY. REP. 1311, 1311 (2007) (describing system im-
provements to Automated Underreporter program); Robert C. Rea, Automation of Underre-
porter Program Scheduled for 1992, 10 Tax Mgm't Wkly. Rep. (BNA) 1575 (1991) (describing
original Automated Underreporter Program). The IRS also has a "Substitute for Return" pro-
gram in which it uses income information received from third parties to generate substitute tax
returns for taxpayers who have failed to file. See, e.g., INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL
§§ 4.19.17.1, 4.19.17.1.3.1-3 (2006) (outlining the program and providing procedures); Tax Man-
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with information returns, however, so long as a taxpayer files a tax
return, the IRS usually accepts the taxpayer's self-reported tax liabil-
ity. The IRS only selects a very small percentage of tax returns for
audit-roughly one-to-two percent at most.170 The audit rate is higher
for certain taxpayer categories, such as larger corporations, but review
even for those taxpayers is not guaranteed or even particularly
likely. 171
Thus, merely declining to comply with a questionable regulation
generally will be inadequate to initiate an IRS enforcement action.
Where the regulation at issue involves the filing of a tax return, the
taxpayer can highlight its noncompliance in its tax returns by attach-
ing noncompliance disclosure forms and even a cover letter inviting
IRS scrutiny.17 2 But even that proactive effort does not guarantee that
the IRS will pursue enforcement.
In sum, the IRS administrative processes imposed upon taxpayers
create a substantial hurdle for taxpayers otherwise seeking to chal-
lenge a Treasury regulation for its procedural failings. This is not to
suggest that IRS officials are engaged in a coordinated effort to keep
procedural challenges out of the courts. Rather, the IRS simply has
limited resources with which to pursue enforcement of the tax laws
agement Weekly Report In Brief, 6 Tax Mgmt. Wkly. Rep. (BNA) 77 (1987) (describing the
program).
170 For example, in 2006, fewer than one percent of all individual income tax returns filed
were audited by the IRS. See TIGTA Examines Compliance Activity Trends Through Fiscal
2006, 2007 TAX NOTES TODAY 68-46, text accompanying note 34 (2007). The vast majority of
those audits were limited "correspondence audits" conducted by mail rather than face-to-face
contact. See id. The audit rate for corporate returns was slightly higher at 1.25%. See id. at text
accompanying note 38.
171 In 2006, the audit rate for corporations with assets of $10 million or more was higher at
18.6%. See id. at fig.50. The IRS also has the Coordinated Industry Case ("CC") program,
previously known as the Coordinated Examination Program, for very large corporations under
which the IRS permanently assigns an agent to audit the corporation's tax compliance over time.
See INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL § 4.1.21.2.2.1.1 (2007) (addressing CIC program planning); id.
§ 1.11.2.6.1 (noting change in program name); John W. Lee, Transaction Costs Relating to Acqui-
sition or Enhancement of Intangible Property: A Populist, Political, but Practical Perspective, 22
VA. TAX REV. 273, 285 n.61 (2002) (summarizing CIC program history). The resulting higher
overall audit rate for larger corporations nevertheless leaves a lot of corporate activity unexam-
ined, as evidenced by the overall corporate income tax return audit rate of 1.25%. See TIGTA
Examines, supra note 170, at text accompanying note 38.
172 The IRS has made available Form 8275-R for the purpose of "disclos[ing] positions
taken on a tax return that are contrary to Treasury regulations." IRS, Dep't of Treasury, Instruc-
tions for Form 8275-R, at 1 (2007), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i8275r.pdf. See
also Anthony C. Infanti, Homo Sacer, Homosexual: Some Thoughts on Waging Tax Guerilla
Warfare, 2 UNBOUND: HARV. J. LEGAL LEFT 27, 53-54 & n.118 (2006), http://www.legalleft.org/
wp-content/uploads/2008/04/2unb027-infanti.pdf (suggesting filing Form 8275-R and a cover let-
ter with a tax return to highlight noncompliance and invite IRS scrutiny).
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and litigate tax cases. IRS officials thus have substantial flexibility in
picking their battles. The administrative review processes in turn offer
taxpayers a sufficient bundle of carrots and sticks to resolve their
cases without litigation. Consequently, many attempts to "tee up" a
challenge to a particular Treasury regulation likely fizzle in the admin-
istrative process. There are many reasons to laud such outcomes, for
conserving judicial resources and giving the IRS the first chance to
correct its own errors, for example. 173 Nevertheless, requiring taxpay-
ers to pursue administrative remedies before obtaining judicial review
likely contributes to the lack of taxpayer challenges against procedur-
ally flawed Treasury regulations, and thus helps perpetuate Treasury's
noncompliance.
B. Perceived Futility of Challenging Temporary Treasury
Regulations
The requirement that taxpayers pursue a refund or obtain a defi-
ciency notice before seeking judicial review, however, cannot alone
explain the lack of procedural challenges in enforcement-based tax
litigation. Irrespective of the low audit rate and the incentives to set-
tle with the IRS, the courts suffer no shortage of tax litigation. Thus,
other reasons must exist to explain why taxpayers who get to court fail
to bring procedural challenges.
Another practical disincentive to taxpayer procedural challenges
stems from the fact that Treasury's most significant APA compliance
failure is its utilization of legally-binding temporary regulations with-
out prepromulgation notice and comment. 174 As noted, in finalizing
temporary regulations, Treasury typically does pursue the notice-and-
comment process. Though some rulemaking involving temporary reg-
ulations takes longer, 175 the process of taking regulations from tempo-
rary to final status usually takes about a year. 176 Of course, the IRS
173 See, e.g., 3 CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW & PRACTICE § 13.21[2] (2d
ed. 1997) (summarizing goals of administrative exhaustion requirements generally).
174 See also supra notes 15-37 and accompanying text (summarizing Treasury's APA non-
compliance in more detail).
'75 See, e.g., Prohibited Allocations of Securities in an S Corporation, T.D. 9302, 71 Fed.
Reg. 76,134, 76,135 (Dec. 20, 2006) (taking sixteen months to finalize temporary regulations,
which in turn had superseded temporary regulations issued two years earlier); Assumption of
Partner Liabilities, T.D. 9207, 70 Fed. Reg. 30,334, 30,335 (May 26, 2005) (finalizing and remov-
ing temporary regulations issued almost two years previously).
176 See, e.g., Additional Rules for Exchanges of Personal Property Under Section 1031(a),
T.D. 9202, 70 Fed. Reg. 28,818, 28,818 (May 19, 2005) (finalizing and removing temporary regu-
lations issued nine months earlier with T.D. 9151); Collected Excise Taxes; Duties of Collector,
T.D. 9221, 70 Fed. Reg. 49,869 (Aug. 25, 2005) (finalizing and removing temporary regulations
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administrative processes for refund claims and deficiency notices and
subsequent litigation process generally will take significantly longer,
even if a taxpayer has requested immediate disallowance of the refund
or waived the right to notice thereof in order to get to court more
quickly. 7 7 Hence, the temporary Treasury regulations often will be
final before judicial review actually commences.
The question therefore becomes whether the courts will consider
Treasury's failure to comply with APA rulemaking requirements in
promulgating temporary regulations to have bearing on the validity of
the related final regulations. 178 The courts' reaction to this quandary
in other administrative contexts has been mixed.
Courts have sometimes held that the procedural invalidity of a
temporary or interim-final regulation renders the succeeding final reg-
ulations likewise invalid.17 9 In other decisions, however, courts have
declined to invalidate final regulations on such grounds,180 based
issued one year earlier with T.D. 9149); Tax Return Preparers-Electronic Filing, T.D. 9119, 69
Fed. Reg. 15,248, 15,248 (Mar. 25, 2004) (finalizing and removing temporary regulations issued
eleven months earlier with T.D. 9053); Transfers of Compensatory Options, T.D. 9148, 69 Fed.
Reg. 48,392, 48,392 (Aug. 10, 2004) (finalizing temporary regulations issued thirteen months ear-
lier with T.D. 9067).
177 Statistics compiled by the Federal Judiciary Center show that civil cases filed in the
federal district courts, where refund actions would be filed, take roughly two years on average to
complete the trial process. See U.S. District Court-Judicial Caseload Profile Report, http://
www.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/cmsd2007.pl (follow "Generate" button) (recording average time peri-
ods from filing to civil trial as ranging from 21.8 months in 2002 to 24.6 months in 2007). An
appeal of a federal district court judgment to a federal circuit court of appeals adds approxi-
mately another year to the litigation process. See U.S. Court of Appeals-Appellate Judicial
Caseload Profile Report, http://www.uscourts.gov/cgi-binlcmsa2007.pl (follow "Generate" but-
ton; then follow "Show Page Two" button under chart) (documenting median times from filing
notice of appeals to disposition as ranging from 10.7 months in 2002 to 12.2 months in 2007). Of
course, many tax cases take much longer to reach judicial review, as taxpayers attempt in good
faith to work through the administrative process first. See, e.g., UnionBanCal Corp. v. Comm'r,
305 F.3d 976, 980-81, 983 n.36 (9th Cir. 2002) (documenting case history including commence-
ment of IRS audit of taxpayer's return in 1994 followed by notice of deficiency issued in 1997
and a Tax Court decision in 1999).
178 See Petry v. Block, 737 F.2d 1193, 1203-05 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (acknowledging the diffi-
culty in fashioning a remedy under such circumstances).
179 See, e.g., Air Transp. Ass'n of Am. v. Dep't of Transp., 900 F.2d 369, 379-80 (D.C. Cir.
1990) (holding final regulations invalid due to procedural failings of interim-final regulations),
vacated without opinion and remanded, 498 U.S. 1023 (1991), vacated as moot, 933 F.2d 1043
(D.C. Cir. 1991); cf. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 683 F.2d 752, 767-68 (3d Cir. 1982)
(rejecting postpromulgation notice and comment as inadequate and invalidating regulatory
amendments so adopted). But see also Michael Asimow, Interim-Final Rules: Making Haste
Slowly, 51 ADMIN. L. REv. 703, 725-26 (1999) (discussing and criticizing this remedy for tempo-
rary or interim-final regulations adopted without good cause).
180 See, e.g., Fed. Express Corp. v. Mineta, 373 F.3d 112, 120 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (holding
postpromulgation opportunity for comment sufficient); cf Mortgage Investors Corp. of Ohio v.
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upon a finding that the agency's handling of postpromulgation com-
ments demonstrated an "open mind" in the process of adopting the
final regulations. 81 Some courts have not required an agency to make
such a showing so long as it demonstrably accepts and responds to
public comments in promulgating its final rules.18 2 Other courts are
concerned that allowing postpromulgation comment to cure tempo-
rary regulation procedural flaws eviscerates the APA rulemaking re-
quirements. 83  Still further, courts are reluctant to undo agency
regulations where doing so will yield no substantive difference.' 84
Further complicating matters in the tax context, I.R.C. § 7805(b)
explicitly allows Treasury to make its final regulations applicable ret-
roactively to the date on which it published in the Federal Register
"any proposed or temporary regulation to which such final regulation
relates" or "[t]he date on which any notice substantially describing the
expected contents of any temporary, proposed, or final regulation is
issued to the public. ' 185 Treasury often does just that when it adopts
Gober, 220 F.3d 1375, 1378-79 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (upholding final regulation "virtually identical
to" temporary regulation because agency considered comments).
181 See, e.g., Advocates for Highway & Auto Safety v. Fed. Highway Admin., 28 F.3d 1288,
1292 (D.C. Cir. 1994) ("The touchstone of our inquiry is thus the agency's open-minded-
ness .... ); Levesque v. Block, 723 F.2d 175, 188 (1st Cir. 1983) ("When the response suggests
that the agency has been open-minded, the presumption against a late comment period can be
overcome and a rule upheld."); cf. U.S. Steel Corp. v. EPA, 605 F.2d 283, 291 (7th Cir. 1979)
("Given that the agency was clearly willing to consider, fully and objectively, all comments in the
post-promulgation period, there is no reason to believe that its consideration of the comments
would have been any different if completed before the effective date.").
182 See, e.g., Gober, 220 F.3d at 1379 ("The APA does not expressly require agencies to
keep an 'open' mind, whatever such a subjective term might mean.").
183 See, e.g., NRDC v. EPA, 683 F.2d at 768 (concluding that allowing postpromulgation
notice and comment to cure prepromulgation failure would circumvent the APA); Sharon Steel
Corp. v. EPA, 597 F.2d 377, 381 (3d Cir. 1979) ("If a period for comments after issuance of a rule
could cure a violation of the APA's requirements, an agency could negate at will the Congres-
sional decision that notice and an opportunity for comment must precede promulgation.").
184 See, e.g., U.S. Steel Corp., 605 F.2d at 291 ("Finally, we cannot say that the rule under
review would have been any different if notice and comment had occurred before the effective
date."); cf Petry v. Block, 737 F.2d 1193, 1203 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("[R]emand to the agency for
further proceedings would not in any event be necessary.").
185 I.R.C. § 7805(b)(1)(B)-(C) (2000). Prior to 1996, the language of I.R.C. § 7805(b) pre-
sumed that all Treasury regulations would apply retroactively unless Treasury stated otherwise;
but in the Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2 enacted in 1996, Congress amended I.R.C. § 7805(b) to limit
retroactive application to specified dates or circumstances, including those listed in I.R.C.
§ 7805(b)(1)(B). See, e.g., Meserve Drilling Partners v. Comm'r, 152 F.3d 1181, 1183-84 & n.4
(9th Cir. 1998) (recognizing both pre-1996 presumption in favor of retroactivity and 1996 amend-
ment); BORIS I. BIrTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES
AND GiFrs 110.4.3 (summarizing I.R.C. § 7805(b) history); Benjamin J. Cohen & Catherine A.
Harrington, Is the Internal Revenue Service Bound by Its Own Regulations and Rulings?, 51 TAX
LAw. 675, 696-706 (1998) (summarizing history of I.R.C. § 7805(b) and the 1996 amendments).
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final regulations predicated on temporary ones. 186 Retroactive appli-
cation of regulations is judicially reviewable for abuse of discretion,
but this is a difficult threshold for taxpayers to surmount.1 87 Thus,
even if a reviewing court vacates and remands a procedurally invalid
Treasury regulation for further agency action, I.R.C. § 7805(b) would
appear by its terms to permit Treasury to apply a subsequent, properly
promulgated final regulation retroactively to the date of a related pre-
litigation NPRM, temporary regulation, or notice. Under such cir-
cumstances, the taxpayer bringing the original regulatory challenge
could find itself subject to the same substantive regulation not just
prospectively but for the same time period as if it had never chal-
lenged the regulation in the first place.' 88
In short, taxpayers may perceive that challenging temporary
Treasury regulations on APA procedural grounds is a futile act not
worth the effort. If a reviewing court is likely to conclude that Trea-
sury's pursuit of notice and comment in finalizing regulations cures
the procedural flaws of the preceding temporary ones, then taxpayers
gain nothing from raising procedural challenges against Treasury's
186 See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.263A-15(a)(3) (as amended in 2005) (making regulatory lan-
guage finalized with T.D. 9203 retroactively applicable to date related temporary regulations
were published); Treas. Reg. § 1.163(d)-l(d) (as amended in 2005) (applying regulations final-
ized with T.D. 9191 retroactively applicable to date temporary regulations were published); As-
sumption of Partner Liabilities, T.D. 9207, 70 Fed. Reg. 30,334, 30,334-35 (May 26, 2005) (same
with respect to other temporary regulations); Section 1374 Effective Dates, T.D. 9236, 70 Fed.
Reg. 75,730, 75,731 (Dec. 21, 2005) (same).
187 The courts have long applied the abuse of discretion standard to evaluate Treasury's
decisions to apply regulations retroactively. See, e.g., Snap-Drape Inc. v. Comm'r, 98 F.3d 194,
203 (5th Cir. 1996) (applying abuse of discretion standard and upholding retroactive application,
despite "inordinately harsh results" produced, because the regulations at issue were not wholly
unforcsecable); Tate & Lyle, Inc. v. Comm'r, 87 F.3d 99, 107-08 (3d Cir. 1996) (finding retroac-
tive application of Treasury regulation not an abuse of discretion and also consistent with due
process); Anderson, Clayton & Co. v. United States, 562 F.2d 972, 979, 981 (5th Cir. 1977) (artic-
ulating relevant factors for reviewing retroactive application of Treasury regulations under the
abuse of discretion standard); Cohen & Harrington, supra note 185, at 679-80 (indicating that
retroactivity may represent abuse of discretion if it has harsh effects on taxpayers, creates irra-
tional distinctions between taxpayers, or undermines taxpayer reliance on previously valid regu-
lations). Although Congress -in 1996 curtailed Treasury's ability to apply its regulations
retroactively, see supra note 185, the changes to I.R.C. § 7805(b) appear not to have altered that
standard of review. See Klamath Strategic Inv. Fund, LLC v. United States, 440 F. Supp. 2d 608,
625 (E.D. Tex. 2006) (applying abuse of discretion standard to post-1996 retroactivity determina-
tion but rejecting retroactive application of regulation because of taxpayer reliance on the
twenty-five year history of court interpretations of the previous regulation). Cf Kandi v. United
States, No. C05-0840C, 2006 WL 83463, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 11, 2006) (applying abuse of
discretion standard to Treasury's decision to apply new regulations prospectively only).
188 See Cohen & Harrington, supra note 185, at 701-02 (observing lack of clarity in tempo-
ral reach of amended I.R.C. § 7805(b)(1)(B)).
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earlier procedural failures. Likewise, if Treasury is able to make a
Treasury regulation retroactively applicable to the date of the preliti-
gation NPRM or other notice, then procedural challenges are of little
use to the taxpayers who raise them. The combination of the inability
of the courts to settle on a remedy when agencies attempt to cure
procedurally flawed temporary regulations and the potential for retro-
active application of Treasury regulations offers further disincentive
against taxpayer procedural challenges in the postenforcement
context.
C. Other Doctrinal Disincentives Within Judicial Review
The uncertainties surrounding the appropriate remedy for Trea-
sury's overutilization of temporary regulations without good cause are
not the only possible reason that taxpayers who otherwise find them-
selves in refund or deficiency litigation decline to raise procedural
challenges. The enforcement-based posture of tax cases raises addi-
tional questions regarding the handling of APA procedural violations
in the tax context and, relatedly, the applicability of judicial deference
doctrines in reviewing IRS adjudications of taxpayer liabilities-ques-
tions with implications that in turn may dissuade taxpayers from as-
serting their procedural rights.
The standard remedy for agency errors in the course of adminis-
trative rulemaking is a remand to the agency, coupled with declara-
tory or perhaps injunctive relief in cases of nonstatutory review.189
With procedural errors, the court will generally remand with instruc-
tions to follow the required procedures properly, though the court
may or may not vacate the offending rule in the interim. 190 Even
where the court finds a regulation's interpretation of the relevant stat-
ute unreasonable, unless the court finds the statute's meaning clear,
189 See 2 KOCH, supra note 173, § 8.31 (recognizing prominence of remand in administra-
tive law cases, "including such orders as remand for further proceedings, remand with instruc-
tion, and reversal and remand. Remand allows for correction while still maintaining the proper
allocation of responsibilities between the courts and the agencies."); 3 PIERCE, supra note 37,
§ 18.1 ("In most cases, successful prosecution of a review proceeding yields instead a judicial
decision setting aside the agency action and remanding the proceeding for further agency action
not inconsistent with the decision of the reviewing court."); id. § 18.4 (recognizing role of declar-
atory and injunctive relief in the course of nonstatutory review).
190 See, e.g., Paulsen v. Daniels, 413 F.3d 999, 1008 (9th Cir. 2005) (considering but declin-
ing to remand without vacating regulation promulgated without notice and comment); Fertilizer
Inst. v. EPA, 935 F.2d 1303, 1312-13 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (remanding regulation for inadequate
notice and comment); see also 2 KOCH, supra note 173, § 8.31[1][b] (recognizing remand without
vacation as a remedy, but noting judicial disagreement over remedy's legality); supra note 45
(citing sources debating merits of remanding a rule without also vacating it).
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the court will generally remand the matter to the agency to reconsider
the appropriate interpretation. 191 With pre-enforcement facial chal-
lenges, remanding a regulation is a conceptually simple outcome, as
the validity of the regulation is the only issue at bar and a remand
respects the agency's dominant policymaking role. Similarly, where a
court is considering a regulation's validity in connection with an en-
forcement-based, as-applied challenge, remand with an instruction
that the agency reconsider its decision is generally considered the ap-
propriate remedy.192 Occasionally courts will proceed to consider the
merits of a regulated party's underlying claim rather than remand to
the agency for further consideration; but those cases are rare.193
This is one area in which tax cases may be different. In either
refund or deficiency litigation, the case that challenges the validity of a
regulation, whether on procedural or substantive grounds, also comes
to the court as the product of an informal adjudication in which the
191 See, e.g., AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 392, 397 (1999) (invalidating
regulation as unreasonable but declining to impose an interpretation and instead remanding
because "Congress is well aware that the ambiguities it chooses to produce in a statute will be
resolved by the implementing agency"); cf. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984) (instructing courts to defer to reasonable agency interpretations
of ambiguous statutes they administer).
192 See, e.g., NLRB v. Pipefitters, 429 U.S. 507, 522 n.9 (1977) ("When an administrative
agency has made an error of law, the duty of the Court is to 'correct the error of law committed
by that body, and after doing so to remand the case to the (agency) so as to afford it the opportu-
nity of examining the evidence and finding the facts as required by law." (quoting ICC v. Clyde
S.S. Co., 181 U.S. 29, 32-33 (1901))); see also 2 KoCH, supra note 173, § 8.32[3](a)-(f) (recom-
mending remand as an appropriate remedy for a variety of agency errors, including mistakes of
law, in applying the law, and in failing to follow procedural requirements).
193 See 3 PIERCE, supra note 37, § 18.1 ("A reviewing court can order an agency to provide
the relief it denied only in the unusual case where the court concludes that the underlying law
and facts are such that the agency has no discretion to act in any other manner, and then only
when the court concludes that a remand to the agency would produce substantial injustice in the
form of further delay of the action to which the petitioner is clearly entitled."). One prominent
exception seems to be Social Security Administration denials of applications for disability bene-
fits, where reviewing courts occasionally do order the agency to award benefits rather than
merely reconsider its decision. See, e.g., Rivera v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 964, 970 (2d Cir. 1991)
(declaring applicant disabled in addition to reversing agency denial of benefits as unsupported
by the record). However, the statutory provision governing judicial review in that context ex-
plicitly authorizes the courts to intrude more deeply into the agency's sphere, which likely ac-
counts for why the courts treat such cases differently. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2000) ("The court
shall have the power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment af-
firming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, with or
without remanding the cause for a rehearing."); see also Sullivan v. Hudson, 490 U.S. 877, 885
(1989) (recognizing that 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) "suggest[s] a degree of direct interaction between a
federal court and an administrative agency alien to traditional review of agency action under the
[APA]"). But see Williams v. Apfel, 204 F.3d 48, 50 (2d Cir. 1999) (remanding disability benefit
denial so that agency could further develop the record).
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IRS applies that regulation to reach a conclusion about a taxpayer's
liability, either denying a refund or determining a deficiency. When
the dispute is over whether Treasury's or the taxpayer's substantive
interpretation of the tax laws should prevail, the court typically re-
solves the interpretive question and thus the issue of the taxpayer's
liability as well, even if the court then remands the case to the IRS for
the purpose of performing the actual tax calculations. 194 The I.R.C.
explicitly grants the Tax Court jurisdiction to redetermine a taxpayer's
liability in the course of judicial review.195 So, if a court vacates and
remands a Treasury regulation on procedural rather than substantive
grounds, that court must consider what to do with the IRS's adjudica-
tory decision and the question of the taxpayer's liability. Theoreti-
cally, the court could also remand the taxpayer's individual case to the
IRS for further adjudication in light of its invalidation of the underly-
ing regulation, but to what end?
Many if not most Treasury regulations merely codify the govern-
ment's choice among alternative interpretations of ambiguous I.R.C.
provisions-interpretations that the IRS could, if it chose, pursue case
by case through adjudication rather than through regulation. Con-
sider, for example, language in Treasury Regulation § 1.61-2(a) char-
acterizing tips as "compensation for services" and thus as an item of
"gross income" under I.R.C. § 61.196 Because Treasury has adopted in
regulatory form its conclusion that tips are gross income, taxpayers as
well as the IRS are legally bound to comply. 197 Before Treasury
amended Treasury Regulation § 1.61-2(a) to include tips, however, the
IRS pursued the same interpretive position on a case-by-case basis as
a matter of enforcement policy against taxpayers who asserted that
tips were nontaxable gifts. 198
194 See, e.g., United Dominion Indus., Inc. v. United States, 532 U.S. 822, 834, 838 (2001)
(disagreeing with the government's interpretation of the consolidated return regulations in favor
of taxpayer's approach as "the better answer" while allowing that Treasury could amend regula-
tions to reflect its view).
195 For example, in deficiency litigation, the I.R.C. gives the Tax Court jurisdiction to "re-
determine the correct amount of the deficiency .... " I.R.C. § 6214(a) (2000). Further, if in the
course of the litigation the Tax Court "finds that there is a deficiency but that the taxpayer has
made an overpayment of such tax, the Tax Court shall have jurisdiction to determine the amount
of such overpayment." Id. § 6512(b)(1).
196 I.R.C. § 61(a)(1) (designating "compensation for services" as "gross income"); Treas.
Reg. § 1.61-2(a) (as amended in 2003) (characterizing tips as "compensation for services").
197 See I.R.C. § 6662 (West Supp. 2006), amended by Pub. L. No. 109-280, § 1219, 120 Stat.
1083 (imposing penalties for noncompliance with Treasury regulations); Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3
(as amended in 2003) (same).
198 See, e.g., Roberts v. Comm'r, 176 F.2d 221, 223-26 (9th Cir. 1949) (siding with the IRS
in concluding that tips are income).
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A procedurally invalid Treasury regulation has no legal force. In
invalidating the regulation for procedural inadequacy, however, a re-
viewing court has not correspondingly rejected Treasury's substantive
interpretation of the I.R.C. From the perspective of an IRS examiner,
an interpretation of the I.R.C. incorporated in a procedurally invalid
regulation still represents IRS policy regarding the proper interpreta-
tion of the statute. 199 To continue the tips example, if a reviewing
court were to invalidate Treasury Regulation § 1.61-2(a) on procedu-
ral grounds and remand the question of the taxpayer's individual lia-
bility to the IRS for reconsideration, it is all but inconceivable that the
IRS examiner would reach a different substantive conclusion; nor
would such an outcome necessarily be arbitrary. For that matter, if
the reviewing court chooses to remand the procedurally flawed regu-
lation without simultaneously vacating it, any substantive interpreta-
tion advanced in that regulation retains its legal effect, at least
temporarily, on taxpayers as well as the IRS.
In short, remanding the question of the taxpayer's liability to the
IRS for further evaluation upon declaring a Treasury regulation inva-
lid on procedural grounds seems rather pointless. Moreover, as noted
above, tax controversies often take a long time to navigate the IRS
administrative processes and reach judicial review, which further ren-
ders a remand for additional agency consideration unattractive. 2 0 In
deficiency litigation in particular, where the taxpayer is not required
actually to pay the tax in advance of litigation, interest on the unpaid
tax liability and related potential penalties continue to accrue so long
as the dispute continues and the tax remains unpaid.201 Accordingly,
tax cases invalidating Treasury regulations on procedural grounds may
represent a situation in which it may be appropriate for the reviewing
court to decide the question of the taxpayer's liability rather than re-
mand the merits to the agency pending resolution of the procedural
error.
Still, just because a court decides to address the merits of the sub-
stantive interpretation underlying the taxpayer's liability rather than
remand the case to the IRS for reconsideration of that issue does not
199 One way to think of a regulation invalidated on procedural grounds is as the equivalent
of a proposed regulation, which likewise carries no legal force but may be worthy of some con-
sideration in evaluating how to interpret the I.R.C. Accord Butka v. Comm'r, 91 T.C. 110, 130
(1988) (describing proposed regulation as "not a complete nullity" despite its lack of legal
effect).
200 See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
201 See I.R.C. § 6601(a), (b)(5) (imposing interest on underpaid taxes beginning with the
date the taxpayer accrued the liability for the tax).
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mean that the taxpayer will prevail. Generally in administrative law
cases, unless the statutory language at issue is unambiguous, the
courts accord an agency's interpretation of a statute it administers
some degree of judicial deference. Following the Supreme Court's de-
cision in United States v. Mead Corp., reviewing courts are obligated
to grant what is known as Chevron deference to statutory interpreta-
tions expressed in formats that carry the force and effect of law.20 2
Although the nature and scope of Chevron deference is hotly de-
bated,20 3 this much is clear: Where the Chevron standard applies, a
reviewing court must defer to a reasonable interpretation of an ambig-
uous statute by the administering agency.2°4 If the agency's interpreta-
tion does not have legal force, then the lesser but still deferential
Skidmore doctrine provides the appropriate evaluative standard.205
The Skidmore standard calls upon a reviewing court to evaluate the
extent to which an agency's legal interpretation is entitled to defer-
ence through a series of factors: "the thoroughness evident in its con-
sideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and
later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to
persuade, if lacking power to control. '206
202 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001); Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natu-
ral Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984). I have argued elsewhere that Treasury
regulations are entitled to Chevron deference, meaning that unless the I.R.C. is clear, then the
courts must defer to Treasury's reasonable interpretations of the I.R.C. as advanced through
Treasury regulations. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865-66; see also Swallows Holding, Ltd. v.
Comm'r, 515 F.3d 162, 167-68 (3d Cir. 2008) (holding that all Treasury regulations are entitled to
Chevron deference); Kristin E. Hickman, The Need for Mead: Rejecting Tax Exceptionalism in
Judicial Deference, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1537, 1617-18 (2006). Others in the tax community have
argued instead that the pre-Chevron deference doctrine of National Muffler Dealers Association
v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 477 (1979), should apply to evaluate tax cases. See Hickman,
supra, at 1554-63 (summarizing National Muffler analysis and tax community dispute regarding
its ongoing vitality).
203 The scholarly literature analyzing the Chevron deference doctrine is simply too vast to
even try to summarize in a footnote. To name just a few of the numerous articles on the subject,
see generally Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered, 72 CH.-KENT
L. REv. 1253 (1997); Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 GEo. L.J.
833 (2001); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Chevron and Its Aftermath: Judicial Review of Agency Interpre-
tations of Statutory Provisions, 41 VAND. L. REV. 301 (1988); Mark Seidenfeld, A Syncopated
Chevron: Emphasizing Reasoned Decisionmaking in Reviewing Agency Interpretations of Stat-
utes, 73 TEX. L. REV. 83 (1994); Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station:
An Empirical Study of Federal Administrative Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 984; Cass R. Sunstein, Law
and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 2071 (1990).
204 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 837.
205 See Mead, 533 U.S. at 227; see also Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587
(2000) (identifying Skidmore rather than Chevron as the standard for evaluating interpretations
lacking the force of lhw).
206 Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). Citing Skidmore, the Mead court
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Odd as it may seem, a court that invalidates a regulation on pro-
cedural grounds may nevertheless defer to the substantive interpreta-
tion of the I.R.C. contained in that regulation. Though it is unclear
whether IRS interpretations of the I.R.C. that are expressed through
informal adjudication are entitled to Chevron or merely Skidmore def-
erence, it seems likely that one or the other deference standard would
apply.20 7 Mead suggests that many, if not most, statutory interpreta-
tions advanced through informal adjudications are only eligible for
Skidmore deference. 208 IRS adjudications of taxpayer liabilities take
place without public input regarding interpretive issues, 20 9 and the IRS
remains largely free to change its litigating positions so long as it of-
fers a reasonable justification for its inconsistency210-both factors po-
tentially suggesting that Chevron deference may be inappropriate in
the context of IRS adjudications of taxpayer liabilities. While appeal-
able to the courts, however, IRS evaluations of refund claims or deter-
minations regarding taxpayer liabilities are the product of semiformal
proceedings mandated by Congress and are legally binding and en-
forceable without resort to the courts, and thus appear potentially
paraphrased these factors, saying that agency interpretations not entitled to Chevron deference
should be evaluated based upon "the degree of the agency's care, its consistency, formality, and
relative expertness, and to the persuasiveness of the agency's position." Mead, 533 U.S. at 228
(citations omitted).
207 See, e.g., Ronald M. Levin, Mead and the Prospective Exercise of Discretion, 54 ADMIN.
L. REV. 771, 772 (2002) (noting that Mead's analysis will apply to render Chevron deference
.appropriate for some informal adjudications and only Skidmore deference for others); Thomas
W. Merrill, The Mead Doctrine: Rules and Standards, Meta-Rules and Meta-Standards, 54 AD-
MIN. L. REV. 807, 821 (2002) (characterizing the question of whether Chevron or Skidmore pro-
vides the appropriate standard for evaluating informal adjudications as an "area of uncertainty"
after Mead).
208 The agency interpretation at issue in Mead was the product of an informal adjudica-
tion-a ruling letter that classified day planners imported by Mead as "[d]iaries... , bound"
subject to a 4% tariff rather than as "[o]ther items" upon which no tariff was imposed. Mead,
533 U.S. at 224-25. The Court concluded that such ruling letters did not carry the force of law
and thus should be evaluated under Skidmore rather than Chevron. See id. at 231. But see
Adrian Vermeule, Introduction: Mead in the Trenches, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 347, 349 (2003)
(suggesting that informal adjudications may possess "[tihe requisite delegatory intent" for Chev-
ron deference).
209 See, e.g., Alan B. Morrison, Administrative Agencies Are Just Like Legislatures and
Courts-Except When They're Not, 59 ADMIN. L. REv. 79, 118 (2007) (suggesting that Chevron
only applies when agencies reach their interpretations through "more or less formal proceed-
ing[s], in which input from outside the agency is sought-a rarity in informal adjudications").
210 See, e.g., Richard Murphy, Judicial Deference, Agency Commitment, and Force of Law,
66 OHIO ST. L.J. 1013, 1043 (2005) (contending that the informal adjudication at issue in Mead
lacked the force of law necessary for Chevron deference because it "left [the agency] free to
change course whenever it pleased in any minimally rational way").
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Chevron-eligible.2 11 Regardless, even under the purportedly less def-
erential Skidmore review standard, judicial review of interpretations
of the I.R.C. advanced in connection with refund claim denials and
deficiency notices may be quite deferential.212
In sum, doctrinal questions abound concerning both how a re-
viewing court should handle a taxpayer's case after invalidating a
Treasury regulation on procedural grounds and the standard by which
a reviewing court should evaluate the merits of the IRS's substantive
interpretation of the I.R.C. under such circumstances. In other words,
the law in this area is a mess. Compounded by the uncertainty regard-
ing the appropriate remedy for temporary regulations promulgated
without good cause, it is hardly surprising that taxpayers would decide
that the costs of wading into the doctrinal quagmire are simply too
great. Again, however, the result may be a lack of an effective check
against Treasury's noncompliance with APA procedural requirements.
IV. Rethinking Pre-enforcement Judicial Review
As this Article documents, the courts and the IRS have adopted
the position that I.R.C. § 7421 and the DJA should be interpreted
broadly to protect the public fisc against even the most indirect or
speculative threat to the inflow of tax revenues posed by pre-enforce-
ment litigation.213  The sum of this jurisprudence stands almost
unyieldingly against pre-enforcement challenges to Treasury regula-
tions promulgated in violation of APA procedural requirements. Yet,
statutory, regulatory, doctrinal, and practical hurdles together strongly
discourage taxpayers from pursuing procedural challenges in the con-
text of refund or deficiency actions-to the point that judicial review
of Treasury's procedural failings is virtually nonexistent. The practical
consequence of the courts' current approach to I.R.C. § 7421 and the
211 See Merrill, supra note 207, at 814-15 (suggesting that congressional imposition of adju-
dication procedures may signal Chevron eligibility); id. at 827 (contending that agency orders
"regarded as res judicata and ... no longer open to challenge on the merits" after a given time
for appeal has elapsed carry force and effect of law).
212 In another article, my coauthor and I document a study demonstrating that, in a five-
year period, the government won 60.4% of cases in which the courts of appeals employed the
Skidmore standard to evaluate agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes. See Kristin E.
Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the Modern Skidmore Standard, 107 COLUM. L.
REV. 1235, 1275 (2007). By comparison, Orin S. Kerr published a study several years ago finding
that the government won eighty-nine percent of cases in which the courts of appeals applied the
Chevron evaluative standard under similar circumstances. See Orin S. Kerr, Shedding Light on
Chevron: An Empirical Study of the Chevron Doctrine in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 15 YALE J.
ON REG. 1, 30-31 (1998).
213 See supra notes 64-72 and accompanying text.
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DJA is a lack of a meaningful judicial remedy for Treasury's procedu-
ral failings.
It is perhaps quixotic to suggest that the courts rethink doctrine
firmly rooted in forty years of jurisprudence. Nevertheless, while
lower courts have occasionally interpreted I.R.C. § 7421 and the DJA
as precluding pre-enforcement review of APA procedural challenges
against Treasury or IRS actions,214 the Supreme Court has never ad-
dressed that particular question.215
Though the APA is only a general statute as compared to the
more specific I.R.C., the APA complements the I.R.C. in that Trea-
sury and the IRS are bound by both statutes. The APA and its notice-
and-comment rulemaking procedures reflect congressional goals of si-
multaneously facilitating government rulemaking and protecting indi-
vidual rights through public participation.216 Treasury's frequent
noncompliance with APA procedural requirements arguably thwarts
these goals and represents an unintended consequence of the Court's
jurisprudence that may occasion some doctrinal rethinking.
The courts may have some flexibility in their interpretation of
I.R.C. § 7421 and the DJA. Revisiting those provisions to allow some
greater amount of pre-enforcement judicial review of facial challenges
to Treasury regulations seems likely to resolve the problems identified
in this Article. 217 In this Part, I offer thoughts on why and how the
214 See, e.g., Stephenson v. Brady, 927 F.2d 596, 1991 WL 22835, at *2, *4-5 (4th Cir. 1991)
(per curiam) (unpublished table decision); Reimer v. United States 919 F.2d 145, 1990 WL
186825, at *1-2 (9th Cir. 1990) (unpublished table decision). Cf Inv. Annuity, Inc. v. Blumen-
thal, 609 F.2d 1, 8-9 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (reading I.R.C. § 7421 and the DJA as statutory limitations
on pre-enforcement judicial review in tax context generally, notwithstanding APA presumption
in favor thereof). But see E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org. v. Simon, 506 F.2d 1278, 1285-86 (D.C. Cir.
1974), overruled on other grounds, 426 U.S. 26 (1976) (concluding that I.R.C. § 7421, the DJA,
and APA § 701 do not operate to preclude judicial review of all pre-enforcement tax claims).
215 In Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, the plaintiff-appellants
raised an APA procedural claim, contending that the IRS failed to put a Revenue Ruling to
which they objected through notice-and-comment rulemaking. Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights
Org., 426 U.S. 26, 33-34 (1976). Although the government claimed that the court lacked juris-
diction to consider this and other claims pursuant to I.R.C. § 7421 and the DJA, see id. at 34-35,
37, the Court declined to consider that issue and instead dismissed the case on standing grounds.
See id. at 37.
216 See, e.g., George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure Act
Emerges from New Deal Politics, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 1557, 1635, 1651 (1996) (characterizing
notice-and-comment rulemaking as "balanc[ing] the interests of agencies in speed and efficiency
and the interests of the public in participating in the rulemaking process"); id. at 1558-60
(describing the APA generally as a "hard-fought compromise" that struck a balance "between
promoting individuals' rights and maintaining agencies' policy-making flexibility").
217 Cf Seidenfeld, supra note 143, at 97-99 (observing that "the possibility of facing a rule
challenge prompts the agency to take greater care when promulgating the rule"). Rightly or
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courts might wish to consider a change and suggestions toward that
end. Yet, I.R.C. § 7421 and the DJA may inevitably constrain the
courts' ability to offer taxpayers a remedy for Treasury's procedural
failings. Thus, in the end, a legislative solution may be necessary.
A. Recognizing and Balancing Competing Congressional Goals
Before contemplating how the courts might mitigate the current
obstacles that discourage taxpayers from challenging Treasury's proce-
dural failures, one must consider whether Treasury's noncompliance
with APA procedural requirements represents the sort of problem the
courts should extend themselves to consider. After all, Treasury and
the IRS may not be perfect, but their attorneys are generally well re-
garded among the tax community as doing the best they can with the
difficult job of administering the I.R.C. To paraphrase Voltaire, we
should not allow perfect to be the enemy of good enough.218
Indeed, many in the tax community are skeptical of the need for
change. A common though not universal view that I have encoun-
tered, and one clearly held by Treasury as it promulgates one tempo-
rary regulation after another, is that taxpayers just want guidance,
even if the cost of that guidance is some deviation from APA rulemak-
ing requirements. 219 This view coincides with accepted wisdom among
administrative scholars holding that pre-enforcement review has sub-
stantially "ossified" agency rulemaking.220 The public notice-and-
wrongly, I am presuming that the courts' jurisprudence regarding the applicability of standing
and ripeness limitations in tax cases would follow, as I argue it has already done. See supra Part
II.B.
218 THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONs 716 (Angela Partington ed., 4th ed. 1996)
(translating "le mieux est l'ennemi du bien" as "[t]he best is the enemy of the good" and attrib-
uting the saying to VOLTAIRE, DiCrIONNAIRE PHILOSOPHIQUE (1770)); see also United Hosp. v.
Thompson, 383 F.3d 728, 733 (8th Cir. 2004) (rejecting process challenge against agency action
deemed "incomplete" but reasonable because "[t]he perfect must not become the enemy of the
good"); MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. FCC, 627 F.2d 322, 340-41 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (observing of
agency regulatory efforts that "[clomplex regulation must still be credible regulation" and "[tihe
best must not become the enemy of the good"). There is little doubt that taxpayers and their
advisers seek as much guidance as possible in interpreting the I.R.C. Why Treasury must satisfy
this demand with legally-binding temporary regulations rather than nonbinding revenue rulings,
revenue procedures, and notices is less clear, but is a topic for another day.
219 When Treasury bothers to claim good cause for issuing temporary regulations without
prepromulgation notice and comment, it typically asserts the need for "immediate guidance."
See, e.g., Guidance Under Section 1502, T.D. 9155, 69 Fed. Reg. 51,175, 51,176 (Aug. 18, 2004);
Return of Partnership Income, T.D. 9117, 69 Fed. Reg. 12,068, 12,068 (Mar. 15, 2004); Effect of
Elections in Certain Multi-Step Transactions, T.D. 9071, 68 Fed. Reg. 40,766, 40,767 (July 9,
2003); see also INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL § 32.1.5.4.7.5.1 (2004) (recommending for invoking
good cause, "These regulations are necessary to provide taxpayers with immediate guidance.").
220 See, e.g., Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifying" the Rulemaking Pro-
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comment process alone consumes a significant amount of agency time
and resources. 221  Pre-enforcement litigation of final regulations
merely adds to that burden and prevents agencies from acting expedi-
tiously to serve the public good.22 2 One could argue particularly that
Treasury's regular promulgation of temporary regulations is an exam-
ple of an agency doing its job of providing regulatory guidance as ex-
peditiously as possible; and that Treasury's pursuit of
postpromulgation notice and comment after issuing temporary regula-
tions, even if technically inconsistent with APA requirements, still rep-
resents a good faith effort to seek and consider outside viewpoints.
Moreover, one must take care in proposing judicial solutions for
even evident governmental wrongdoing. Whether and when judges
should fashion remedies is a subject of much debate. While the senti-
ments of Marbury v. Madison2 3-that every right deserves a rem-
edy-may be laudable, 224 the courts have also long recognized that not
all wrongs can or should be resolved through the judicial process. 225
Particularly when Congress has gone to great lengths to construct a
remedial process, as it has done in the tax context, the courts are
rightly hesitant to circumvent that process needlessly.226 Yet, reaching
cess, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1410-26 (1992) (listing burdens of judicial review among contributors to
a more cumbersome modern APA rulemaking process); Pierce, supra note 143, at 88-89 (citing
pre-enforcement judicial review under Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967), as a major
cause of rulemaking ossification); Mashaw, supra note 143, at 233-35 (criticizing pre-enforce-
ment judicial review).
221 See, e.g., PIERCE ET AL., supra note 38, § 6.4.6b, at 336 ("Promulgation of a single major
rule often requires five to ten years and tens of thousands of agency staff hours.").
222 See, e.g., Pierce, supra note 143, at 88-89 (advocating reversal of Abbott Laboratories
and a return to enforcement-based judicial review); Mashaw, supra note 143, at 235 (extolling
the virtues of postenforcement judicial review). But see Seidenfeld, supra note 143, at 97-99
(noting potential problems with APA compliance and regulation quality arising from delaying
judicial review).
223 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
224 See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
225 See, e.g., supra note 2 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367,
388 (1983) (counseling caution in supplementing comprehensive statutory and regulatory reme-
dial schemes with judicial remedies). But see Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 440 (1988)
(recognizing in dicta that congressional failure to remedy apparent agency wrongs "in no way
suggests a conscious choice to leave those wrongs unremedied").
226 Cf Schweiker, 487 U.S. at 429 (declining to interfere with congressionally adopted re-
medial scheme for wrongful termination of disability benefits, "[w]hether or not we believe that
its response was the best response"); Bush, 462 U.S. at 388 ("The question is not what remedy
the court should provide for a wrong that would otherwise go unredressed. It is whether an
elaborate remedial system that has been constructed step by step, with careful attention to con-
flicting policy considerations, should be augmented by the creation of a new judicial remedy for
the ... violation at issue. That question obviously cannot be answered simply by noting that
existing remedies do not provide complete relief for the plaintiff.").
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such a conclusion should be a matter of informed consideration rather
than mere inertia.227
As noted, the courts have identified the congressional purpose
behind I.R.C. § 7421 and the DJA as protecting the government's abil-
ity to collect tax revenues without judicial interference. 228 In other
words, one could say that, in adopting I.R.C. § 7421 and the DJA,
Congress has expressed a preference for legal, enforcement-based
remedies for governmental error as a means of achieving its goal of
protecting the fisc. The courts have steadfastly defended this per-
ceived congressional objective through their broad interpretation of
the limits on judicial review posted by I.R.C. § 7421 and the DJA.
Yet, the APA also reflects congressional purposes. For the mod-
ern regulatory state to function, Congress must delegate tremendous
lawmaking power and policymaking discretion to agencies like Trea-
sury. Nevertheless, while such delegations may be practically neces-
sary, they are also antidemocratic. While perhaps less than ideal, the
APA notice-and-comment process, coupled with judicial review of the
agency's adherence to that process, serves as a second-best proxy for
the legislative process when Treasury or any other agency seeks to
bind the public with regulations having the force and effect of the stat-
utes they purport to interpret. Hence, Congress intended the APA's
notice-and-comment requirements not only to facilitate government
rulemaking efforts but also to protect individual rights through public
participation before agencies adopt binding regulations.229 Congress
provided further for the protection of individual rights with the judi-
cial review provisions of the APA, which contemplate a broad judicial
role in checking agency utilization of delegated power.230
The current approach to judicial review in the tax context focuses
all but exclusively on the purported purposes of Congress with I.R.C.
§ 7421 and the DJA while essentially ignoring APA-reflected congres-
sional goals. Though Treasury's noncompliance is not limited to its
227 Cf. Bush, 462 U.S. at 388 ("The [remedial] policy judgment should be informed by a
thorough understanding of the existing regulatory structure and the respective costs and benefits
that would result from the addition of another remedy .... ).
228 See, e.g., Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 103 (2004); South Carolina v. Regan, 465 U.S. 367,
386 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co., 370 U.S. 1,
7 (1962); see also supra note 59 and accompanying text.
229 See supra note 216 and accompanying text.
230 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (2000); see also, e.g., Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136,
140-41 (1967) (recognizing APA's broad presumption in favor of judicial review of agency ac-
tion); see also supra notes 38-43 (outlining APA and judicial support for pre-enforcement review
of agency action).
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regular use of temporary regulations, that particular aspect of Trea-
sury's haphazard attitude toward APA procedural requirements offers
a nice example of the potential consequences of this imbalance.
Treasury claims to value public input in promulgating regulations
and demonstrates its sincerity regularly, not least through its pursuit
of postpromulgation notice and comment, even as it declaims the legal
necessity of doing so, and otherwise. 231 Yet, seeking public comment
only after promulgating legally binding, if temporary, regulations
leaves substantial room for interested parties to conclude that Trea-
sury has made up its mind and to refrain from commenting as a
result.23
2
The public participants most likely discouraged from this process
are not the big firm tax attorneys and sophisticated professional orga-
nizations. The relationship between Treasury and IRS attorneys, big
firm practitioners, and organizations like the American Bar Associa-
tion and New York Bar Association Tax Sections is a close one; so-
phisticated industry groups accustomed to lobbying similarly have
ways of making their views on prospective regulations known outside
the notice-and-comment process.233 Yet, while Treasury and IRS at-
torneys value input from these sources, they may not necessarily asso-
ciate it with the APA's notice-and-comment process, as Treasury often
receives informal and unsolicited feedback on regulatory projects
from such parties even before proposed or temporary regulations are
published. In other words, whether or not Treasury complies with no-
tice-and-comment rulemaking requirements in promulgating its regu-
231 See, e.g., I.R.S. Notice 2008-47, 2008-18 I.R.B. 869 (Apr. 17, 2008) (asking the public to
identify issues for guidance projects); I.R.S. Notice 2007-17, 2007-12 I.R.B. 748 (Feb. 28, 2007)
(announcing pilot program designed to increase public participation in Treasury's rulemaking
efforts); Hickman, supra note 4, at 1797-99 (discussing evolution of Treasury and IRS attitudes
toward APA compliance and citing Treasury and IRS officials concerning the value of the notice-
and-comment process).
232 See Notice: Administrative Conference of the United States, Adoption of Recommen-
dations, 60 Fed. Reg. 43,108, 43,111-12 (Aug. 18, 1995) (expressing concern that agency use of
temporary or interim final regulations in the absence of good cause would promote perceptions
of agency bias in the rulemaking process and consequently discourage public participation). Cf.
Stephanie Stern, Cognitive Consistency: Theory Maintenance and Administrative Rulemaking, 63
U. Prr. L. REV. 589, 620-30 (2002) (suggesting that even the standard notice-and-comment
rulemaking process discourages public participation by committing agency officials to a single
approach and creating perceptions of agency bias in favor thereof).
233 Korb Laments Penalty Pileup, Promises More Practitioner-Initiated Guidance, 2007 TAX
NoEs TODAY 206-2 (Oct. 24, 2007) (quoting IRS Chief Counsel Donald Korb as acknowledging
that "this has been going on forever where people come in and give us proposed ideas-often in
secret").
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lations, it seems likely that Treasury will both seek and receive
feedback from powerful private attorneys and organizations.
Instead, it is those who are not so well connected-small-firm tax
attorneys and their clients, for example-who are most likely to be
marginalized by Treasury's haphazard approach to notice-and-com-
ment rulemaking. Though not tax-specific, a recent study by Mariano-
Florentino Cu6llar of public comments in different agency rulemak-
ings found high levels of lay public participation yielding legally rele-
vant, if less sophisticated, comments that were clearly worthy of
agency consideration.234
This leads to a second concern, that Treasury's failure to comply
with APA procedural requirements undermines taxpayer respect for
the tax system more generally. The I.R.C. and Treasury regulations
interpreting its provisions collectively impose direct legal conse-
quences upon a far larger segment of the population than any other
federal regulatory scheme. Consequently, few areas of government
regulation fall under as dark a cloud of public suspicion as the tax
system. By discouraging taxpayer participation in the notice-and-
comment process, Treasury likely encourages, or at least offers little to
mitigate, public cynicism about the tax system's legitimacy.
Whether or not one accepts that premise, however, it should at
least be clear that Treasury's failure to follow the laws that govern its
behavior undermines the government's credibility in enforcing the tax
laws as they apply to taxpayers. The government is currently engaged
in a protracted war against both sophisticated tax shelter participants
and unsophisticated tax protestors. Neither group is likely to point
directly at Treasury's failure to follow APA procedural requirements
to excuse their own actions; but Treasury plays right into the hands of
its critics when it supports the aggressive pursuit of rule breakers
while breaking the rules itself.2 35
We may be content with prioritizing revenue collection over more
symbolic and abstract concerns about public participation and demo-
cratic legitimacy. Correspondingly, we may be satisfied with facilitat-
234 See Mariano-Florentino Cudllar, Rethinking Regulatory Democracy, 57 ADMIN. L. REV.
411, 414, 460-61, 468-69 (2005).
235 Cf Hartman v. Comm'r, T.C.M. (RIA) 2008-124 (2008), app. A (appending statement
of former IRS Chief Counsel B. John Williams in response to finding that IRS attorneys perpe-
trated a fraud on the courts in battling a set of tax shelter cases: "Although some would like to
deny that the tax system plays a vital role in society, and few of us actually like paying taxes,
confidence in the integrity and fairness of the tax system is vital to our democracy. The tax
system touches more people in this country than any other part of the government or our laws.
The loss of confidence in its integrity is the loss of confidence in the government itself.").
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ing interpretive guidance at the expense of public participation.
Further, we may decide that there are better ways of encouraging ei-
ther public participation in the rulemaking process or public faith in
the tax system than requiring Treasury to adhere more faithfully to
APA procedural requirements. Finally, if Congress truly intended the
stark prioritization that the courts have implicitly assumed, then the
choice was Congress's to make. Ultimately, however, these choices
are not costless, and it is not at all clear that either Congress or the
courts actually intended the consequences of the courts' current inter-
pretation of I.R.C. § 7421 and the DJA.
In fact, the evolution of the courts' interpretation of I.R.C. § 7421
suggests the opposite: a conscious effort to balance the competing
goals of safeguarding taxpayers from arbitrary action and protecting
the fisc. Before the Court decided Williams Packing and even before
Congress adopted the APA, the courts were significantly more recep-
tive to the availability of equitable relief in tax cases. In a line of
jurisprudence originating with Miller v. Standard Nut Margarine Co.,
decided in 1932, the courts required only a demonstration of "special
and extraordinary circumstances," the sort of irreparable injury ordi-
narily required to establish equitable jurisdiction, to allow pre-en-
forcement judicial review in tax cases.236 As the courts found many
taxpayers' cases eligible for equitable jurisdiction and thus entitled to
judicial review, the more lenient approach of Standard Nut Margarine
was sharply criticized as eviscerating I.R.C. § 7421.237 Meanwhile, in
the decades immediately after Congress adopted the APA in 1946, the
now-disbanded Legislation and Regulation ("L&R") Division of the
Office of Chief Counsel of the IRS was both heavily involved in
236 Miller v. Standard Nut Margarine Co., 284 U.S. 498, 551 (1932) (interpreting predeces-
sor of I.R.C. § 7421 as inapplicable in the presence of "special and extraordinary facts and cir-
cumstances"); see also Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 744-45 (1974) (recognizing
Standard Nut Margarine as equating I.R.C. § 7421 with traditional equitable principles); Paul H.
Asofsky, Injunctions and Declaratory Judgments in Federal Tax Controversies, 28 RUTGERS L.
REV. 785, 791-93 (1975) (recognizing support of Standard Nut Margarine and its progeny for
substantial equity jurisdiction in tax cases).
237 See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ., 416 U.S. at 744 (describing Standard Nut Margarine as "effec-
tively repealing [I.R.C. § 7421]"); James J. Lenoir, Congressional Control over Suits to Restrain
the Assessment or Collection of Federal Taxes, 3 ARIZ. L. REV. 177, 195 (1961) (criticizing Stan-
dard Nut Margarine as "den[ying] any force whatever to [I.R.C. § 7421] except as declaratory of
an equitable rule previously followed by the courts"); Gale Ann Norton, The Limitless Federal
Taxing Power, 8 HARV. J.L. & Pun. POL'Y 591, 622-23 (1985) (observing that jurisprudence
based on Standard Nut Margarine "virtually negated the Anti-Injunction Act, as taxpayers could
often prove that payment of taxes would inflict irreparable financial loss").
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promulgating Treasury regulations and highly attentive to administra-
tive law requirements.23 8
Such was the climate in 1962 when the Supreme Court decided
the Williams Packing case, replacing the exceptional circumstances
view of the courts' equitable jurisdiction over tax cases with the pre-
sent restrictive model.2 39 In fact, Treasury did not issue temporary
regulations at all until the 1970s, and then did so only on a very lim-
ited basis; it was only in the 1980s that Treasury's utilization of tempo-
rary regulations escalated dramatically. 240 Due at least in part to a
reorganization of the IRS and resulting elimination of the L&R Divi-
sion in the 1980s, IRS attorneys today seem much less aware of the
law surrounding the APA rulemaking requirements than the IRS at-
torneys of that era.241
In short, the Court decided Williams Packing and opted to fore-
close virtually all pre-enforcement review in the tax context at a time
when Treasury and the IRS were substantially more attuned to and
compliant with APA procedural requirements. The pendulum be-
tween safeguarding individual taxpayers and protecting the fisc had
swung too far in one direction, and the Court with Williams Packing
sought to correct that imbalance. Since then, of course, Treasury's
lack of compliance with the APA has shifted significantly, and that
pendulum arguably has swung too far the other direction, to the sub-
stantial detriment of taxpayers' procedural rights under the APA.
Hence, one could argue not only that the history of jurisprudence in-
terpreting I.R.C. § 7421 and the DJA demonstrates the susceptibility
of those provisions to more than one reasonable judicial interpreta-
tion, but also that changes in the way that Treasury conducts its
rulemaking efforts suggest that the courts should reconsider the impli-
cations of their jurisprudence.
238 See Hickman, supra note 4, at 1796-97 (documenting history of Treasury and IRS per-
ceptions of APA requirements based on interviews with former government officials and other
sources); Laurens Williams, Preparation and Promulgation of Treasury Department Regulations
Under Internal Revenue Code of 1954, in 8 MAJOR TAX PLANNING 733, 748-50 (1956) (discussing
role of L&R Division in drafting and reviewing Treasury regulations).
239 See Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co., 370 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1962) (adopting
current restrictive standard); see also Bob Jones Univ., 416 U.S. at 744-45 (reiterating Court's
repudiation in Williams Packing of Standard Nut Margarine's "extraordinary and exceptional
circumstances test").
240 See Hickman, supra note 4, at 1797.
241 See Hickman, supra note 4, at 1796-99 (documenting evolution of IRS lack of attention
to IRS procedural requirements based on interviews with former Treasury and IRS officials and
attorneys and commentary by others).
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Moreover, though Congress rarely acts in this area, some contem-
porary support exists for the idea that Congress continues to care
about how Treasury goes about administering the I.R.C. For example,
in 1988, Congress adopted I.R.C. § 7805(e), which requires Treasury
to publish an NPRM whenever it issues a temporary regulation and
sunsets temporary Treasury regulations not finalized within three
years.242 Although legislative history offers little meaningful insight
into Congress's intent with I.R.C. § 7805(e), scholars have docu-
mented a general understanding that Congress was sufficiently un-
happy with Treasury's practice of allowing temporary regulations to sit
on the books for years without any noticeable effort toward finaliza-
tion to mandate that Treasury pursue at least some degree of public
participation in the regulatory process.243
More recently, in 2007, the IRS issued Notice 2007-17 in which it
announced a new pilot program that would give interested taxpayers a
chance to respond to notification that the IRS is considering regula-
tions by submitting their own draft proposals. 244 Treasury could then
draw from taxpayer-submitted draft regulations in putting together its
own proposed regulations. 245 Congressional reaction to this proposal
was sharply negative, reflecting concerns that the regulatory process
would be hijacked by special interests at the expense of broader public
participation .246
In summary, substantial justification exists for at least considering
a more relaxed approach to equitable jurisdiction and pre-enforce-
ment judicial review in tax cases. A more cooperative interpretation
of I.R.C. § 7421, the DJA, and the APA would allow the courts to
effectuate both congressionally expressed goals of defending the fisc
from premature judicial meddling in tax policy and of protecting indi-
vidual taxpayers from arbitrary action by Treasury, rather than pro-
moting one exclusively to the detriment of the other. All that remains
is how to accomplish this task.
242 See I.R.C. § 7805(e)(1) (2000) ("Any temporary regulation issued by the Secretary shall
also be issued as a proposed regulation."); id. § 7805(e)(2) ("Any temporary regulation shall
expire within 3 years after the date of issuance of such regulation.").
243 See, e.g., Asimow, supra note 29, at 363-64 (discussing history of I.R.C. § 7805(e)); Vas-
quez & Lowy, supra note 21, at 254 (identifying reasons for adopting I.R.C. § 7805(e)).
244 See I.R.S. Notice 2007-17, 2007-12 I.R.B. 748 (Feb. 28, 2007).
245 See id.
246 See generally Baucus, Grassley Oppose IRS Plan to Outsource Writing of Agency Rules,
2007 TAx NOTES TODAY 52-32 (Mar. 15, 2007); Tax Administration: Letting Practitioners Help
Write Guidance Poses No More Risk of Influence, TIGTA Says, Daily Rep. for Executives
(BNA), at G-6 (Mar. 12, 2008).
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B. Potential Doctrinal Alternatives
Should the courts be amenable to rethinking their approach to
interpreting I.R.C. § 7421 and the DJA without congressional inter-
vention, at least two possible alternatives exist for reading those provi-
sions more cooperatively with the APA. The first option derives from
statutory language, reading I.R.C. § 7421 more narrowly based on its
text and thus in conjunction with, rather than displacing, the APA's
waiver of sovereign immunity. The second expands the South Caro-
lina v. Regan exception to render the courts' conception of the ade-
quacy of legal remedies in tax cases more consistent with the
conception in other contexts.
First, the courts could interpret the text of I.R.C. § 7421 more
narrowly to permit pre-enforcement review of facial challenges to
Treasury regulation validity. I.R.C. § 7421 prohibits suits "for the pur-
pose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax . . . ." In
their quest to protect the fisc, the courts have interpreted this lan-
guage not just broadly but holistically to encompass any suit that ulti-
mately might reduce the flow of tax revenues into government coffers.
Yet the text is also susceptible of a narrower interpretation focused
more specifically on and temporally proximate to "assessment" and
"collection" as the I.R.C. uses those terms.
Although taxpayers are obliged to file returns and pay taxes
based on their own determinations of taxes owed pursuant to the
I.R.C. and the many rules and regulations thereunder, the I.R.C. rec-
ognizes assessment and collection as discrete actions taken by the IRS
to obtain payment of taxes, interest, and penalties determined to be
due.247 Assessment is an action taken by the government to record a
taxpayer's liability for taxes, interest, or penalties on its books of ac-
count.248 The I.R.C. both authorizes and provides rules for the cir-
cumstances and timing of that recording.24 9 Collection, in turn, is the
247 Cf Comm'r v. Shapiro, 424 U.S. 614, 616-17 (1976) (discussing prerequisites to IRS's
ability to assess or collect taxes); Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247, 259-60 (1935) (discussing
more generally the particular role of assessment in the exaction of taxes by the sovereign).
248 See I.R.C. § 6203 (2000) (prescribing the method of assessment as "by recording the
liability of the taxpayer in the office of the Secretary [of the Treasury] in accordance with rules
or regulations prescribed by the Secretary"); see also CASEY, supra note 57, § 2:02 (describing
assessment as the act of recording a taxpayer's liability).
249 I.R.C. § 6201(a) authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury "to make ... assessments of all
taxes." I.R.C. § 6201(a). I.R.C. § 6501(a) imposes a general three-year limitation period on tax
assessments but provides several exceptions from that rule. See I.R.C. § 6501(a), (c). Other
I.R.C. provisions further authorize and impose rules upon the government for making "supple-
mental assessments," "termination assessments," and "jeopardy assessments." I.R.C. § 6204
(authorizing supplemental assessments "whenever it is ascertained that any assessment is imper-
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process by which the government obtains payment of liabilities after
the IRS has made an assessment.250 As with assessments, the I.R.C.
authorizes and establishes parameters for the execution of the collec-
tion function. 251
A plausible reading of I.R.C. § 7421 would preclude courts only
from enjoining the IRS from pursuing the discrete actions of making
an assessment or pursuing the collection process with respect to taxes
the IRS has otherwise concluded are due.2 5 2 In other words, one can
reasonably read the text of I.R.C. § 7421 as limited to as-applied chal-
lenges in the course of IRS enforcement, more immediately in tempo-
ral proximity with assessment and collection processes. Indeed, as
noted, many if not most tax cases seeking injunctive relief involve tax-
payers disclaiming the IRS's actual, in-process application of the tax
laws to their own particular factual circumstances, either in the course
of assessment and collection or immediately prior thereto.25 3 Addi-
tionally, with its statements in Hibbs v. Winn suggesting the availabil-
ity of pre-enforcement challenges to taxpayer benefits that, if
successful, would increase tax revenues, the Court has signaled some
fect or incomplete in any material respect"); id. § 6851(a), (b) (authorizing termination assess-
ments of taxes, interest, and penalties upon finding that the taxpayer intends to leave the country
or hide his assets to avoid collection, but requiring the Secretary also to notify the taxpayer
immediately of such assessment); id. § 6852 (granting authority and imposing requirements for
termination assessments in cases involving political expenditures by tax-exempt organizations);
id. § 6861(a)-(b) (authorizing the Secretary to assess identified tax deficiencies immediately "[i]f
the Secretary believes that the assessment or collection of a deficiency ... will be jeopardized by
delay," but requiring the Secretary to notify the taxpayer "within 60 days after the making of the
assessment"). I.R.C. § 6215 provides for the assessment of tax deficiencies found by the Tax
Court, while I.R.C. § 7485 allows a taxpayer who loses before the Tax Court to post a bond for
the purpose of staying assessment pending appeal. I.R.C. §§ 6215, 7485.
250 See, e.g., CASEY, supra note 57, § 13C:01 (noting that, while the framework for the col-
lection process is outlined in I.R.C. §§ 6302-05 and 6331-44, most collection procedure detail is
prescribed through Treasury regulations and informal instructions to IRS personnel).
251 For example, I.R.C. § 6303 instructs the IRS to give notice to taxpayers and demand
payment within sixty days of making an assessment. See I.R.C. § 6303. I.R.C. § 6306 authorizes
the IRS to contract with private parties to assist in certain aspects of collecting amounts due. See
I.R.C. § 6306. Other provisions authorize and establish extensive rules for levying upon taxpay-
ers' property as part of IRS collection efforts. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 6331(a) (authorizing the IRS to
collect taxes by levy if a taxpayer neglects or refuses to pay after notice and demand); id. § 6334
(exempting certain property from levy by the IRS); id. § 6342 (instructing the IRS in how to
apply the proceeds from taxpayer property seized and sold in the course of collection).
252 Cf Asofsky, supra note 236, at 803 (recognizing the plausibility of interpreting I.R.C.
§ 7421 as applying only "at a relatively late stage in the taxing process, i.e., after the tax has been
determined").
253 See, e.g., Comm'r v. Shapiro, 424 U.S. 614, 616-19 (1976) (recognizing assessment as a
particular act under the I.R.C. and noting that the IRS has made an assessment in the case at
bar); supra note 62 and accompanying text (identifying other such cases).
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sympathy for a more textually oriented approach to interpreting
I.R.C. § 7421.254
Adopting a narrower, text-based interpretation of I.R.C. § 7421,
however, presents a few difficulties. First, this approach sets up a po-
tential conflict with the DJA. The DJA's tax exception does not util-
ize the same potentially limiting language as I.R.C. § 7421. Instead,
the DJA simply denies declaratory relief in cases "with respect to Fed-
eral taxes" except as otherwise explicitly provided. 255 Given the
breadth of this language, conclusions by many lower courts that I.R.C.
§ 7421 and the DJA should be interpreted in pari materia256 seem to
derive at least partly from the courts' broad interpretation of I.R.C.
§ 7421.257
Deciding that the DJA broadly and independently limits the
availability of the declaratory remedy would not necessarily preclude
the courts from interpreting I.R.C. § 7421 to allow injunctive relief.
Yet, declaratory relief is more commonly utilized to remedy agency
procedural violations because injunctive relief requires a showing of
irreparable harm, among other reasons, and thus is less likely to be
appropriate.2 5 8 Moreover, granting an injunction while denying de-
claratory relief seems decidedly odd.
Prior to Williams Packing, when the more lenient "extraordinary
circumstances" test from Standard Nut Margarine prevailed, at least
some courts interpreted the DJA as coextensive with I.R.C. § 7421,
notwithstanding the former's more restrictive language, on the theory
254 See Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 103-04 (2004); see also supra notes 73-75 and accompa-
nying text. Cf. Foodservice & Lodging Inst., Inc. v. Regan, 809 F.2d 842, 846 & n.10 (D.C. Cir.
1987) (per curiam) (recognizing jurisdiction for pre-enforcement review over regulatory provi-
sion requiring employers to report data so that the IRS could study tipping patterns, tip-sharing
arrangements, and tip compliance patterns as unrelated to the assessment or collection of taxes).
255 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2000).
256 See supra note 57 and accompanying text (citing sources).
257 Hence the suggestions by some that the scope of the DJA's limitation may be broader
than that of I.R.C. § 7421. See, e.g., Alexander v. "Americans United" Inc., 416 U.S. 752, 759
n.10 (1974) (opining that the DJA's tax exception "is at least as broad as the prohibition of the
Anti-Injunction Act"); Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 732 n.7 (1974) (same); IRS,
Litigation Guideline Memorandum GL-52, 1991 WL 1167968, at *4 (June 28, 1991) (taking the
position that the DJA is broader in scope than I.R.C. § 7421); CASEY, supra note 57, § 2:47
(recognizing existing jurisprudence treating I.R.C. § 7421 and DJA as coterminous but observing
that the language of the DJA seems "more comprehensive" than I.R.C. § 7421).
258 See 3 PIERCE, supra note 37, § 18.4 ("It is more difficult to obtain injunctive relief than
declaratory relief. Injunctive relief is available only when the plaintiff establishes irreparable
harm and, in the context of past unlawful official conduct, only when the court determines that
the conduct will persist in the absence of an injunction.").
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that any other outcome would be illogical.25 9 Legislative history simi-
larly suggests that Congress intended the DJA primarily to buttress
I.R.C. § 7421, rather than operate as a separate limitation upon judi-
cial review.260 In short, reconciling a narrower, text-based view of
I.R.C. § 7421 with the broader language of the DJA presents a bit of
an interpretive conundrum, though not necessarily an insurmountable
one.
Second, while plausible, a narrow, text-based interpretation of
I.R.C. § 7421 could, in theory, prove even less restrictive of judicial
review than the approach that the Court in Williams Packing sought to
curtail. As noted, the Standard Nut Margarine extraordinary circum-
stances test focused on traditional equitable jurisdiction doctrine
rather than the text of I.R.C. § 7421.261 That approach allowed the
courts to decide on a case-by-case basis whether facts and circum-
stances justified equitable jurisdiction. Limiting the scope of I.R.C.
§ 7421 and potentially the DJA to preclude judicial review only when
assessment and collection are imminent draws a more absolute juris-
dictional line, potentially opening the door to any case that raises a
colorable facial challenge. In other words, pursuing a narrow, text-
based interpretation of I.R.C. § 7421 risks pushing the pendulum
again back too far in favor of judicial review.
A second alternative modification to the current jurisprudence
may prove less problematic: expanding the reach of the exception
from I.R.C. § 7421 and the DJA announced in South Carolina v. Re-
gan.262 As discussed above, the Court in that case declined to impose
the restrictions of I.R.C. § 7421 and the DJA to foreclose pre-enforce-
ment judicial review where the challenging party had no legal remedy
available.263 South Carolina v. Regan was an unusual case in that the
State was not itself the object of the challenged tax provision, and thus
could never be the subject of any enforcement-based action. 264 In
259 See, e.g., Bullock v. Latham, 306 F.2d 45, 47-48 (2d Cir. 1962) (recognizing jurispru-
dence permitting equitable jurisdiction under I.R.C. § 7421 and opining that "[i]t is unreasonable
to think that a court with authority to issue a restraining order is without power to declare the
rights of the parties in connection therewith" (quoting Tomlinson v. Smith, 128 F.2d 808 (7th Cir.
1942))); see also Asofsky, supra note 236, at 799-80 ("Those courts dealing explicitly with the
issue [of the relationship between I.R.C. § 7421 and the DJA] have held that the two statutes are
coterminous.").
260 See S. REP. No. 74-1240 (1935).
261 See supra note 236 and accompanying text.
262 South Carolina v. Regan, 465 U.S. 367 (1984).
263 See id. at 378, 380-81; see also supra notes 90-94 and accompanying text (summarizing
South Carolina v. Regan exception from 1.R.C. § 7421).
264 See South Carolina v. Regan, 465 U.S. at 373, 378-81.
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other words, the State had no tax, interest, or penalties to pay for
which it could seek a refund, nor could the State hope to obtain Tax
Court jurisdiction through a deficiency notice. The Supreme Court,
however, has not expressly restricted this exception to such limited
circumstances.
In theory, the courts could reasonably extend the South Carolina
v. Regan exception to apply not only where a legal remedy is abso-
lutely unavailable but also where a legal remedy is practically unavail-
able. As documented in this Article, a court could credibly conclude
that the statutory, regulatory, and doctrinal limitations have such an
effect on APA procedural challenges against Treasury regulations.
Though there is some potential that an expanded South Carolina v.
Regan exception might swamp the limitations of I.R.C. § 7421 and the
DJA, the courts would arguably retain the flexibility to prevent that
occurrence.
At a minimum, the courts could apply the South Carolina v. Re-
gan exception to allow judicial review of Treasury regulations that im-
pose information reporting requirements or other similar obligations
only indirectly related to taxes due. Recall that the courts' current
approach to I.R.C. § 7421 and the DJA under such circumstances, ex-
pressed in Debt Buyers' Association v. Snow and other cases, is that
parties subject to such regulations simply decline to comply and sue
for a refund of any penalties that may result.265 The courts' present
position in such cases is wholly contrary to the dominant principle be-
hind Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner: that regulated parties should not
be forced to choose between complying with an arguably invalid regu-
lation or risking penalties for noncompliance. 266 Ultimately, however,
extending the South Carolina v. Regan exception from I.R.C. § 7421
and the DJA may prove too limited to incentivize Treasury to follow
APA procedural requirements more consistently.
Conclusion
Despite Treasury's claims to the contrary, the evidence is strong
that Treasury has an APA compliance problem. While Treasury's
public rejection of the findings of my study is perhaps predictable, it
also suggests that Treasury may not reform its practices without
265 Debt Buyers' Ass'n v. Snow, 481 F. Supp. 2d 1, 10 (D.D.C. 2006); see also Foodservice
& Lodging Inst. v. Regan, 809 F.2d 842, 844-45 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (reaching same
conclusion); California v. Regan, 641 F.2d 721, 723 (9th Cir. 1981) (same); supra notes 96-98 and
accompanying text (summarizing this jurisprudence).
266 See Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 152-53 (1967).
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outside intervention. Thus, the question is what, if anything, can be
done to remedy the situation.
It is unlikely that any one explanation exists for why taxpayers
fail to challenge Treasury's procedural failings in court. Undoubtedly,
satisfaction with any amount of guidance regarding the meaning of the
I.R.C. and a general lack of awareness of administrative law doctrines
and jurisprudence among the tax bar play a role. Nevertheless, as this
Article documents, it seems clear that the statutory and doctrinal limi-
tations on judicial review in the tax context are a contributing factor
as well.
Neither Congress nor the courts can force taxpayers who are sat-
isfied with the status quo to raise legal challenges against Treasury
regulations for their procedural failings. Similarly, Congress and the
courts are largely powerless to educate tax lawyers and their clients
regarding the availability of potential APA-based claims. For those
who may be deterred by statutory and doctrinal obstacles, however,
Congress and the courts have the power to effect a remedy.
Traditionally, the courts have been the primary vehicle by which
regulated parties vindicate their procedural rights. Prevailing jurispru-
dence notwithstanding, the courts seem to have sufficient room to ef-
fect some degree of doctrinal change toward that end here. Whether
the courts can or should provide the remedy for Treasury's lack of
compliance with APA rulemaking requirements is not a given, how-
ever. If the courts decline to act, then hopefully Congress will. At a
minimum, should Congress and the courts choose to perpetuate the
status quo, they should do so after thoughtful and informed considera-
tion of the costs rather than from inadvertence, ignorance, and inertia.
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